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With the end of the INF Treaty in 2019, trilateral arms control – meaning arms 
control between the United States, Russia, and China – has gained center stage. 
Only shortly after the U.S. withdrawal, U.S. President Trump declared that he 
wants a new nuclear pact to be signed by both Russia and China. Other U.S. 
administration officials have set the goal of including China in a future follow-on 
framework to the New START agreement, which expires in February 2021.
It is easy to dismiss the idea of trilateral arms control or arms control with China 
as far-fetched and just another lofty goal of the mercurial Trump administration. 
However, a couple of reasons speak quite strongly for a novel format that would 
go beyond the Cold War-style U.S.-Russian bilateralism. As the world enters an 
age of seemingly unconstrained great power competition, arms control between 
the “big three” could help strengthen arms race and crisis stability and provide a 
platform for strategic dialogue. Also, now that the bilateral frameworks between 
Washington and Moscow are eroding, bringing in China could signal to the rest 
of the world that nuclear arms control has a future. The latter could help to renew 
the disarmament promise that nuclear-weapons states have signed up to under 
the NPT.
Then again, could trilateral arms control be possible at all? What would be ne-
cessary conditions? Why should Washington, Moscow, and Beijing engage in an 
uncertain endeavor that promises to significantly affect their strategic relation-
ships? Those are just three of the questions I asked the authors of this report to 
address. It is important to note that the goal of this report was never to arrive at 
a consensual opinion on trilateral arms control. Rather, I asked Alexey Arbatov 
(Russia), David Santoro (United States), and Tong Zhao (China) to reflect on 
their respective national perspective and outline potential ways forward. What 
is encouraging, none of the authors sees trilateral arms control as pointless or 
impossible. They all find reasons why their respective nation would benefit from 
such a format.
Even though the time might not be ripe for arms control between the “big three,” 
it definitely makes sense to start thinking about the possible goals of and ap-
proaches to trilateral arms control.
Ulrich Kühn (editor), Hamburg, March 2020
Foreword
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 ❚ None of the three authors deems trilateral arms control – meaning arms 
control between the United States, Russia, and China – impossible or pointless. 
Instead, all three list compelling reasons why their respective nation would 
benefit from such a trilateral format. They even agree that trilateral engagement 
should start now. Though, they also agree that under current conditions, many 
trilateral arms control options will most likely have to wait and would only be 
possible over the mid to long term.
 ❚ None of the three authors excludes the possibility that the next round of 
nuclear arms control would still, initially, be only between the United States and 
Russia or that Washington and Beijing might agree on a bilateral framework 
before arms control goes trilateral.
 ❚ All three authors recommend their governments to engage further in nuclear 
arms control, including in various already existing formats. In particular, all three 
agree that the New START agreement, limiting the strategic forces of the United 
States and Russia, should not simply be left to expire in 2021. Instead, the 
agreement should be extended for another five years.
 ❚ Against the background of great power competition between the United 
States, Russia, and China, the authors see a heightened potential for arms race 
and crisis instability, particularly in East Asia, should unconstrained nuclear and 
conventional competition ensue. In that regard, particularly the end of the INF 
Treaty creates uncertainties for regional and global security and could contribute 
to additional arms racing in various weapons systems, the authors conclude.
 ❚ Any future trilateral arms control arrangement should, according to the 
authors, take into account the asymmetric nature of the nuclear balance between 
the United States and China as well as between Russia and China. These 
asymmetries affect their latent or actual deterrence relationships, their postures 
and doctrines, and potential future arms control measures. These asymmetries 
also imply the need for a certain amount of flexibility in the systems covered 
should it ever come to the stage of defining the scope of trilateral arms control. 
Executive Summary
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 ❚ According to the authors, the three countries should publicly acknowledge 
that they are mutually vulnerable in order to help strengthen strategic stability. In 
that regard, all authors identify U.S. ballistic missile defense systems as a serious 
obstacle to progress on arms control, which could be solved were compromise 
possible.
 ❚ In the near term – the authors stress to varying degrees – all sides should 
engage in confidence-building measures that could prepare the ground for later 
reductions, including military-to-military contacts, capacity-building efforts, and 
increased track 1.5 exchanges.
 ❚ All three authors agree that a future trilateral arrangement or a bilateral 
Chinese-American arrangement cannot be based on the idea of exclusively 
constraining China’s capabilities. Rather, any future format would have to find a 
give-and-take formula that somewhat satisfies the respective national interests.
 ❚ As regards the scope of a potential trilateral arms control arrangement, the 
three authors suggest and discuss different though also similar approaches that 
could involve forces considered “strategic” under New START, those of INF-
range under the now defunct INF Treaty, and sea- and air-based systems outside 
of the INF Treaty’s original land-focused scope.
 ❚ In order to address asymmetry in systems and numbers between the three 
countries, the authors prefer not to end up with an arms control arrangement that 
legalizes massive increases in numbers in order to arrive at more symmetrical 
ceilings. According to the authors, such possible solution would run counter to 
international disarmament obligations. Alternatively, also the option of mixing 
certain systems under equal umbrella ceilings is discussed.
IFSH Research Report #002
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1. INTRODUCTION
“I am certain that, at some time in the future, President Xi and I, together with 
President Putin of Russia, will start talking about a meaningful halt to what has 
become a major and uncontrollable Arms Race.”1 This was a tweet by U.S. 
President Donald Trump sent on December 3, 2018 on the heels of the U.S. 
decision to withdraw from the U.S.-Russia Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
(INF) Treaty and amidst questions about the future of New START. It was the first 
time a U.S. president officially called for an expansion of nuclear arms control, 
which so far has been bilateral: between the United States and the Soviet Union 
during the Cold War, and then between the United States and Russia.
Trump’s tweet was not a vague wish expressed in a random tweet. In his 2019 
State of the Union Address, the President suggested there should be a new 
INF Treaty that would include China and others. 2 Two months later, he insisted 
that the United States, Russia, and China should “[come] together” to control 
the arms race and, later that month, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that 
the next agreement should be more comprehensive and include China.3 News 
reports followed indicating that Trump had ordered his administration to prepare 
for a comprehensive, trilateral arms control push, and senior administration 
officials explained they would approach Moscow and Beijing separately and 
together.4 Former officials from the George W. Bush administration, too, stressed 
that “China’s nuclear forces must also be included in any future [arms control] 
negotiations.”5 Then, in May, Republican senators Tom Cotton and John Cornyn, 
along with Republican representative Liz Cheney, introduced legislation that 
would prevent New START extension unless, among other things, China were 
made a party, and senior administration officials Andrea Thompson and David 
Trachtenberg also stressed that Russia and China should be brought to the arms 
control table.6
Yet when Trump publicly said that he and Putin had discussed making a “three-
way deal” with China, adding that Beijing “would very much like to be part of 
A U.S. Perspective on Trilateral 
Arms Control: A Long Shot – 
Within Reach
David Santoro
Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
9
that deal,” the Chinese leadership denied and rejected the offer.7 Beijing then 
reiterated its opposition repeatedly, echoing its earlier rejection of joining a new 
INF Treaty.8
China has argued that the United States and Russia should continue to lead on 
arms control because, despite having undertaken important nuclear reductions 
since the end of the Cold War, they still have much larger arsenals than China 
and other nuclear-armed states. This is a solid argument. Today, of the 13,890 
nuclear warheads believed to exist in the world, the United States and Russia 
possess 12,685 and the rest is split between France (300), China (290), the 
United Kingdom (215), Pakistan (150), India (140), Israel (80), and North Korea 
(25).9 Therefore, much like the French, UK, Pakistani, Indian, Israeli, and North 
Korean arsenals, the Chinese arsenal is a small fraction of U.S. and Russian 
forces.
For now, U.S. thinking about trilateral arms control is unclear. It is unclear if 
U.S. officials want incorporation of China into New START, or if they want a new 
agreement. If they want the latter, it is unclear if that agreement would focus on 
nuclear warheads or deployed forces, or if it would include a verification regime. 
Recently, there have even been suggestions that Washington may engage 
Russia and China separately first. Christopher Ford, Assistant Secretary at the 
Department of State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, 
stated in December 2019: “We want to engage directly with our Russian and 
Chinese counterparts in bilateral and ultimately trilateral talks on strategic 
security, nuclear posture and doctrine, and the role of nuclear weapons in our 
respective security postures, with an eye to setting in place measures to deliver 
real security results to our nations and the entire world.”10 Shortly thereafter, 
Ford invited Russia and China to bilateral “strategic security dialogues” with the 
United States; a U.S.-Russia dialogue round took place in mid-January 2020, 
while China did not respond.
2. WHY TRILATERAL ARMS CONTROL IS HERE TO STAY
Still, trilateral arms control is here to stay, for three reasons. First, because Trump 
is personally interested. In a March 2018 call with Putin, Trump had already 
stated that he wanted to bring the arms race under control.11 Trump has also 
had a longstanding affinity for arms control because it presents an opportunity 
to showcase his self-promoted deal-making skills.12 Besides, Trump is serious 
about bringing China into the arms control fold: China has been a major focus 
IFSH Research Report #002
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of his foreign policy, a country his 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) 
deems “revisionist,” and against which his administration has orchestrated 
comprehensive pushback.13
Beyond Trump, while Republicans have proved more skeptical than Democrats, 
there is general agreement in the United States that arms control is good for the 
country. Americans believe it helps maintain stable and predictable relationships 
with competitors. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), for instance, states 
that arms control “can foster transparency, understanding, and predictability 
in adversary relations, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstanding 
and miscalculation.”14 Americans also believe arms control helps sustain 
U.S. extended deterrence and alliance cohesion, and that it benefits U.S. 
nonproliferation policy; the United States, as the other “Nuclear-Weapon States” 
(NWS) identified in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
is required to move toward disarmament, and Washington has regarded arms 
control as one of these steps.15 As the United States is refocusing on Asia and, 
in so doing, getting into an increasingly competitive relationship with China, a 
bipartisan issue that will extend beyond the Trump administration, incorporating 
China into arms control will continue to gain traction.16
Second, trilateral arms control is unlikely to die because Moscow is not opposed 
to it. The Russians agree with Americans about arms control. Russia’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov, for instance, listed predictability as one of arms 
control’s core contributions to Russian security and Moscow, too, thinks that 
arms control helps Russia fulfill its NPT obligations. Moreover, as explained later, 
despite growing closeness and cooperation between Russia and China, there is 
a deterrence relationship between the two countries. That is why Moscow has 
long called for arms control multilateralization and, while the Russians have also 
been interested in involving the United Kingdom and France (the two nuclear-
armed U.S. allies), they have welcomed the U.S. call for trilateral arms control. 
Ryabkov stated: “When our American colleagues actually get to the point where 
they give us something concrete, we will look at this with interest and I hope in 
a positive way.”17
Third, the push for trilateral arms control is unlikely to go away because arms 
control multilateralization is the plan at the core of the NPT. Arms control 
began as a bilateral process (U.S.-Soviet, then U.S.-Russia) because these 
two countries have held most nuclear weapons. Yet the NPT and subsequent 
decisions made under its umbrella have made clear that all NWS are required 
Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
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to lead on disarmament and, therefore, engage in arms control. There has also 
been general agreement that the “NPT holdouts,” i.e., the countries that have 
developed nuclear weapons outside the NPT (India, Israel, Pakistan, and now 
North Korea), are required to disarm. This cannot be dismissed, especially 
given the development of the nuclear-disarmament norm, which has become 
so strong recently that a new process has emerged outside the NPT. Frustrated 
by what they deem to be slow disarmament progress, several countries and 
civil-society movements have sought fast nuclear-weapon elimination under the 
banner of the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. Yet because 
nuclear weapons cannot disappear overnight (because they are tied to security 
realities), arms control will continue to be the only viable answer. The pressure is 
on, however, for it to deliver results faster, and do so beyond the bilateral format.
Analysts frequently suggest that arms control multilateralization should begin 
with all NWS, i.e., that China, France, and the United Kingdom should join Russia 
and the United States, building upon the “P5 process” established in 2009.18 
NPT holdouts should then follow.
There is, however, a good rationale for incorporating only China first. Not just 
because expanding the process further would be too big to manage, but also 
because unlike China, the other nuclear-armed states will either not increase 
their forces (France, Israel, the United Kingdom) or do so by a few dozen (North 
Korea) or hundreds (India and Pakistan). Plainly, the impact of the nuclear 
decisions and developments made by these seven states will remain limited. 
Nuclear dangers will increase because of choices made in New Delhi, Islamabad, 
and Pyongyang, but the consequences will be either managed (by sanctions and 
extended deterrence for North Korea) or remain contained at the sub-regional 
level (in South Asia for India and Pakistan). By contrast, China has been building 
its arsenal steadily, both quantitatively and qualitatively and, recently, it has done 
so fast. Besides, China has been building up in an opaque manner: Beijing has 
not been transparent about its modernization program, fueling speculations 
about its intent, particularly given that the Chinese leadership has adopted an 
increasingly assertive posture. The considerable financial and technological 
resources that Beijing has at its disposal also give China the option to grow its 
arsenal much bigger, much faster.
China must be aware of these dynamics. By now, it must know that competition 
with the United States is here to stay and that the nuclear dimension of the 
bilateral relationship will not be insulated. As detailed later, the United States has 
IFSH Research Report #002
12
insisted that China was a key driver in its decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty. 
Beijing, therefore, must be beginning to wonder if it is still in its interest to stay 
out of arms control and face the prospect of uncontrolled nuclear competition.
Accordingly, it is timely to start thinking about trilateral arms control and how it 
could take shape.
3. THE STRATEGIC SITUATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, RUSSIA, 
AND CHINA: PAST, PRESENT, AND LOOMING DYNAMICS
To provide focus for a trilateral arms control plan, it is important to begin with an 
analysis of the nuclear dynamics between the United States, Russia, and China. 
Relationships between these three countries have evolved but each state has 
envisaged major war with either of the other two, leading each to try to deter both. 
Relationships between the three countries, therefore, have all been deterrence 
relationships. That means arms control has a role to play: arms control is only 
meaningful if there is a possibility of conflict between states.
3.1 THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA
The United States and Russia have held most of the world’s nuclear weapons and 
have been nuclear peer competitors, even though they have used arms control 
to push nuclear weapons into the background of their relationship. However, the 
U.S.-Russia relationship has deteriorated so much recently that it is threatening 
arms control and setting the stage for renewed nuclear competition.
During the early Cold War, Washington and Moscow engaged in intense arms 
races, only to realize after dangerous crises (Berlin in 1961 and Cuba in 1962) 
that they were better off regulating their competition through arms control. This 
began with a “hotline” (1963) and then limitations of, and reductions on, U.S. 
and Soviet offensive and defensive arsenals with the Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks Agreement (SALT) and the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Systems (1972), the INF Treaty (1987), and the START process (which 
began in the 1980s). Arms control required U.S. and Soviet leaders to think 
beyond fighting and winning wars and accept that, because they were mutually 
vulnerable, they should regulate their forces, and keep them roughly on par.19 
Both Washington and Moscow, however, continued to pursue damage-limitation 
strategies.20
Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
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With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, as Russia was 
in transition, U.S.-Russia competition gave way to partnership, and there was an 
opportunity to push nuclear weapons into the background. Significant progress 
was made. Washington and Moscow cooperated to repatriate to Russia the 
nuclear weapons scattered in the territories of the former Soviet Union. They 
engaged in nuclear-security work, agreed to reciprocal reductions in sub-
strategic nuclear weapons (1991), and reduced strategic nuclear weapons 
through START (1991). Moreover, Washington and Moscow negotiated START 
II (1993), began thinking about START III (1997), and agreed on responses to 
emerging missile threats from the Middle East and Northeast Asia in a manner 
consistent with the ABM Treaty (1997).
From the late 1990s, however, the U.S.-Russia relationship went from bad to 
worse. With Putin in power, the hopes of turning Russia into a democracy 
dissipated. Putin also became confrontational toward the United States and 
the West, which, he believed, had taken advantage of Russia’s weaknesses 
and encroached on its interests and “near abroad” by intervening in the former 
Yugoslavia, enlarging NATO up to Russia’s borders, and allegedly backing 
the color revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, the U.S.-Russia 
strategic relationship suffered. Russia ratified START II (2000) on the condition 
that the U.S. Senate approve the ABM Demarcation Agreement, which proved 
impossible and led to Washington’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and then 
Russia’s withdrawal from START II (2002), paving the way for the U.S. decision 
to create in Europe a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) site to protect the U.S. 
homeland (2007). This did not prevent U.S.-Russia cooperation, especially after 
9/11, and arms control resumed with the ratification of the Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty (SORT, 2003). But problems remained. Moscow became 
worried about U.S. BMD and strategic conventional weapons, believing that 
behind its claim that it only wants protection against “rogues” such as North 
Korea or Iran, Washington was after “absolute security”: the ability to defend 
against, and even prevail over, Russia.21
The U.S. attempt to reset the U.S.-Russia relationship in the late 2000s failed. 
A key factor was what Moscow perceived to be NATO’s aggressive action in 
Libya, which extended beyond its mandate and suggested that the United States 
wanted to act as a hegemon. The reset helped deliver New START (2010), but did 
not resolve Russia’s concerns over BMD and strategic conventional weapons.22 
So, when in 2013 Washington proposed that U.S. and Russian strategic forces 
be reduced further, and sub-strategic and non-deployed forces constrained, 
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Moscow declined. Moscow wanted an agreement that included not only 
strategic offensive weapons, but also BMD, strategic conventional weapons, and 
space and counter-space weapons, and it pushed for the multilateralization of 
the process. This proved impossible for Washington, which wanted a narrower 
bilateral agreement and BMD for protection against rogues; Washington tried, 
unsuccessfully, to address Russian BMD concerns.23
The U.S.-Russian relationship then took a turn for the worse with Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea (2014) and intervention in eastern Ukraine, which Putin 
justified to protect Russian interests against U.S./Western overreach. Russia’s 
interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, intervention in Syria, and 
attempted assassination of a UK national and his daughter using chemical 
weapons deepened the crisis. Putin’s post-Crimea promise to “snap back hard” 
if threatened brought nuclear weapons back into the foreground, especially 
when four years later, in 2018, the Russian president unveiled two novel strategic 
nuclear weapons.24 This drove the United States to rethink nuclear deterrence 
and, in the context of launching its modernization program (to follow Russia, 
which began modernizing in 2011), led to the decision to advance two new nuclear 
weapons.25 This also contributed to the U.S. decision to withdraw from the INF 
Treaty, which Washington had assessed Moscow was violating since 2014, and 
raised questions about the future of U.S.-Russia arms control, particularly given 
Russia’s insistence that the next round should be comprehensive and include 
BMD.26 This was a redline for Washington, which was preoccupied by Moscow’s 
sub-strategic forces. By the end of the 2010s, therefore, the U.S.-Russia arms 
control partnership was falling apart, foreshadowing renewed competition.
3.2 THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
Lately, the U.S.-China relationship has deteriorated so much that there are now 
signs of spillover effects into the strategic relationship, which, for the first time, 
could make nuclear weapons a key feature of U.S.-China dealings. Yet, unlike 
the United States and Russia, Washington and Beijing are not nuclear peers and 
they do not have an arms control relationship.
U.S.-China relations were tense in the early Cold War, especially when it became 
clear, notably after the Korean War (1950-1953) and Taiwan Strait confrontation 
(1954-1955), that Beijing was developing a nuclear arsenal, initially with Soviet 
assistance.27 Washington, however, quickly realized that Sino-Soviet nuclear 
cooperation never materialized because Moscow, too, was concerned about 
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Beijing going nuclear. That led U.S. officials to try and prevent Beijing from 
reaching its goal by promoting arms control and nonproliferation, and exploring 
military options, including with the Soviets.28
Yet, after Beijing tested its first atomic device in 1964, Washington decided that 
the United States could live with a nuclear China. The belief was that the benefits 
of U.S.-China rapprochement outweighed the costs and that the United States 
was better off with China on its side against the Soviet Union. Another reason 
was the realization that China was primarily concerned with the Soviet Union, 
not the United States, and that Beijing had neither the ability nor, seemingly, the 
willingness to engage in nuclear competition. Unlike Washington and Moscow, 
Beijing developed a strategy of assured retaliation and did not pursue nuclear 
warfighting. That is why Beijing has claimed to have a “self-defense nuclear 
strategy,” why it has adopted a no-first use (NFU) policy, and why it has “only” 
developed a small nuclear force, which it has kept de-mated.29
Through to the late 2000s, therefore, the United States was interested in engaging 
China.30 The hope was that China would transform into a power that accepted 
the existing international order, endorsed market forces, and implemented 
democratic reforms.31 The United States also adopted such an approach 
because it had other priorities: the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the loose-
nuke problem after the Soviet collapse, then small actors with nuclear-weapons 
ambitions, and the strengthening of the nonproliferation and nuclear-security 
regimes.
But from the late 2000s, Beijing became critical of the international order 
and began to assert itself, notably in Asia. Moreover, instead of endorsing 
market forces, Beijing began to expand mercantilist tools, and the Chinese 
Communist Party, especially under Xi Jinping’s rule, became more repressive 
and more nationalistic, seemingly to achieve the “China Dream” of national 
rejuvenation.32 Washington also became concerned because Beijing ramped up 
the modernization, diversification, and expansion of its strategic force, notably 
of its short- and intermediate-range systems (systems banned by the INF Treaty, 
to which China was not a party).33 Concerns ran high because Beijing does not 
reveal the size and shape of its nuclear arsenal, or the goal of its modernization 
program.
Beijing, however, argued that its developments are defensive, that it has 
always maintained a self-defense nuclear strategy and NFU policy, and that its 
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modernization efforts are consistent with its tradition of minimum deterrence and 
solely aimed at developing a “lean and effective” force. These are codewords 
to stress that the goal is for Chinese forces to remain reliable and survivable, 
especially as U.S. BMD and strategic conventional weapons improve, and as 
the U.S. refocuses on Asia. China has had the same worries as Russia: that 
it may become the target of such U.S. military developments because the 
United States allegedly seeks “absolute security.” China has been especially 
concerned because the United States has refused to accept an NFU policy and 
the existence of mutual vulnerability between them, suggesting that Washington 
is not ruling out launching a disarming strike against Beijing.
Yet in addition to doubting the strength and veracity of China’s NFU policy, 
the United States has become concerned that Beijing may abandon minimum 
deterrence and “sprint to nuclear parity” with Washington (and Moscow), especially 
as that the latter have been building their nuclear arsenals down.34Concerns have 
also increased because, besides refusing to be transparent about its activities, 
China has rejected nuclear dialogue (and arms control) despite repeated U.S. 
invitations, and adopted an assertive military posture.35
The relationship deteriorated further from the mid-2010s, when the United 
States identified China as a major competitor and began pushing back against 
Beijing. In the context of Beijing’s military reforms (launched in 2015) and with 
uncertainty, despite Chinese reassurances, about the impact on Chinese nuclear 
strategy and weapons programs, the United States now seems to have opted 
for nuclear competition with China because it is easy to increase and cement 
its (already immense) superiority over Beijing, and because Washington has 
likely concluded that it is necessary given that the regional balance of power is 
shifting in China’s favor. The idea is that a more decisive U.S. nuclear advantage 
over Beijing will compensate for Washington’s widening loss of conventional 
superiority in the region (mostly given the growth of China’s intermediate-range 
arsenal).36 That is why the U.S. decisions to develop two new nuclear capabilities 
and withdraw from the INF Treaty were made with Russia and China in mind. 
Significantly, a senior administration official said that China’s growing military 
force was “the strategic reason for the U.S. INF withdrawal.”37 By the late 2010s, 
therefore, while questions remained, the U.S.-China relationship appeared 
ripe for rivalry, with the prospect of nuclear weapons being brought into the 
foreground of that relationship.
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3.3 RUSSIA AND CHINA
Russia and China are neither allies nor adversaries. Best described as 
“complicated,” their relationship has become increasingly cooperative recently. 
The chief reason: confronting the United States, hence why their relationship has 
been called an “axis of convenience.”38 Still, Russia and China have a deterrence 
relationship, one that is both imbalanced and implicit.
The Soviet Union and China were allies (against the United States) in the early 
Cold War before splitting over competing visions for communism and Soviet 
reluctance to share nuclear-weapon technology with Beijing. The relationship 
reached a low point in 1969 when Moscow and Beijing engaged in border 
skirmishes and, later, when Moscow considered striking China’s nascent 
nuclear-weapons program.39 From the 1970s through to the end of the Cold War, 
after Washington attempted to cement the Soviet-Sino split by engaging Beijing, 
the Soviet Union and China remained wary neighbors.
After the Cold War, most analysts expected the Russia-China relationship to 
deteriorate because the two countries share a long land border and have different 
power trajectories and competing interests in Central Asia, Eastern Siberia, and 
the Arctic. Yet the trend has been toward greater cooperation. In 1994, Moscow 
and Beijing sealed a “constructive partnership,” which translated into a mutual 
NFU agreement. In 1996, Moscow and Beijing upgraded their relationship to a 
“strategic partnership” and, in 2001, signed a “Treaty of Good-Neighborliness 
and Friendly Cooperation.” Then, in 2011, they signed a “comprehensive strategic 
partnership,” which has helped expand cooperation. By 2019, cooperation had 
deepened so much that Putin described Russia-China relations as “almost an 
alliance-type relationship.”40
Cooperation has taken several forms. Russia has exported military hardware to 
China, including modern air and missile defense systems, such as the S-400, and 
has begun assisting Beijing to develop early-warning systems. Russia and China 
have also participated in the other’s military exercises, and the two countries 
have conducted combined drills. Moreover, Moscow and Beijing have pursued 
low-level CBMs, notably by concluding a ballistic missile launch notification 
agreement (2009), and they have coordinated their opposition to many U.S. 
policies, such as on BMD and strategic conventional weapons. In June 2019, 
they issued a joint statement on “global strategic stability,” the second of its 
kind (the first was in 2016), in which they criticized “Some individual powers [for 
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pursuing] unilateralism and bullying” and identified themselves as the “stability 
anchor” for world peace.41
There is a deterrence relationship between Russia and China, however, even 
though neither acknowledges it. As in the U.S.-China relationship, the stronger 
power (Russia) does not recognize that it is worried about, let alone mutually 
vulnerable with, its weaker counterpart (China). Yet Moscow is concerned. 
Russia’s Military Doctrine states that Russian nuclear weapons help prevent 
“an outbreak of nuclear military conflicts involving the use of conventional arms 
(large-scale or regional war).”42 As two Russian analysts have explained, the 
terms “regional war” can only mean a conflict with China because war with the 
United States/NATO would be larger than regional.43 Moreover, in calling for 
arms control multilateralization, Moscow has made clear that it is concerned 
that Beijing may “sprint to parity” as U.S.-Russian reductions continue. Similarly, 
while there is no evidence to substantiate it, China, too, must be worried 
about its much stronger northern nuclear neighbor, and some of its short- and 
intermediate-range missiles probably target Russia. Even as Russia-China ties 
are strengthening, therefore, an imbalanced and implicit deterrence relationship 
exists between the two countries, limiting the potential for cooperation. Because 
the trajectory is up for China and down for Russia, deterrence may soon play a 
greater role.
The three bilateral relationships differ greatly. There is a symmetric deterrence 
relationship between the United States and Russia, one that is worsening and 
could end their arms control partnership and lead to renewed nuclear competition. 
By contrast, the United States and China have an asymmetric deterrence 
relationship, with the former dominating over the latter. That relationship, which 
does not include an arms control partnership, is also deteriorating and could lead 
to nuclear competition. Meanwhile, the Russia-China deterrence relationship 
is asymmetric, too (with Moscow dominating over Beijing) but also latent, and 
both Moscow and Beijing are strengthening their ties, while steering clear of 
arms control. Overall, there is a dynamic beyond intensification of the bilateral 
relations: a three-part system is emerging, one characterized by an odd man out 
(the United States) but also three-way counterbalancing moves.44
4. OUTLINE OF A TRILATERAL ARMS CONTROL PLAN
In this strategic configuration, conceptualizing a trilateral arms control plan is 
possible. It must be done against the backdrop of the theoretical ends, ways, 
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means, costs, and risks of arms control, and, to work, such a plan would have 
to be based on an asymmetric framework and require flexibility from all three 
countries. 
4.1 BACKGROUND ON ARMS CONTROL
Consider first the ends of arms control. Arms control is not about eliminating 
nuclear weapons; this is disarmament. Arms control also is not about locking 
in an advantage against a competitor. Rather, it is, per its original theorists, a 
tool states can use to enhance their security by maintaining strategic stability 
with their competitors, i.e., to prevent war and arms competition.45 Because 
they have their roots in the Cold War, strategic stability and arms control have 
also traditionally been associated with nuclear weapons and the U.S.-Soviet 
competition.46
To foster strategic stability, arms control parties need to exercise restraint over, or 
impose constraints on, their nuclear policies, strategies, forces, and postures to 
ensure that they meet two criteria. First, that there is no incentive for either party 
to be the first to use military force in a crisis (“crisis stability”). An associated 
concept is “first-strike stability,” the removal of incentives for either arms control 
party to be the first to use nuclear weapons to disarm its opponent.47 Second, 
arms control parties need to remove incentives for them to improve their position 
by building more or better weapons (“arms-race stability”). As one analyst has 
summed up, the idea is for arms control parties to reach an equilibrium, or a 
balance between them, and encourage equanimity, “the ability of states to 
avoid escalation and return to a state of equilibrium despite perturbations in 
the international system, such as the emergence of new technologies, threats, 
crises, or conflicts.”48 These are the ways of arms control and, historically, 
strategic stability has rested on mutual assured destruction (MAD), the idea 
that each side need to maintain forces that can survive a first strike and inflict 
damage in retaliation that the attacker would find unacceptable, thereby making 
nuclear or major conventional war irrational and arms races pointless.49 This was 
the organizing principle for U.S.-Soviet relations during the Cold War and it is still 
the foundation for U.S.-Russia relations today. De facto, as suggested earlier, a 
MAD relationship also exists between the United States and China, and between 
Russia and China, even though mutual vulnerability is neither acknowledged nor 
equal in these relationships.
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Regardless of the specific means of arms control, transparency is a must 
because transparency leads to predictability and predictability is a prerequisite 
to both crisis and arms-race stability. While treaties have traditionally been the 
means of choice, many other, less formal means exist. Reciprocal unilateral 
actions, CBMs, reciprocal restraint, or regular strategic dialogue and military-to-
military discussions to improve mutual understanding on the parties’ thinking on 
specific issues or emerging technologies are all valuable arms control means.
Turning to costs, it is important to stress that arms control requires its parties 
to abandon the pursuit of superiority, at least in some categories of weapons or 
domains. It requires them to acknowledge mutual vulnerability, either explicitly 
or implicitly, and to be willing to preserve it. Relatedly, arms control requires its 
parties to negotiate among one another and, therefore, to make compromises 
and engage in a give-and-take process.
Finally, arms control is not risk-free. An arms control party can conclude an 
unfavorable agreement, one that leaves him at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the other 
parties. Other risks include the loss of secrets, or that one of the parties cheats, 
scoring gains over the other parties even as the latter have a (false) sense of 
security. Still, while acknowledging these risks, the first theorists stressed the 
value of arms control. Herman Kahn said: “We must be willing to do [arms 
control] even though we may thereby run great risks, since the alternative, an 
uncontrolled situation, probably involves greater risks.”50
Against this backdrop, a trilateral arms control plan requires two key features: 
asymmetry and flexibility.
4.2 TRILATERAL ARMS CONTROL REQUIRES ASYMMETRY 
It is worth appreciating why symmetric nuclear arms control would not be 
attractive. If the goal is strategic stability, i.e., create a balance between arms 
control parties, then symmetric nuclear arms control would present two options 
to manage strategic forces, where the United States and Russia dominate over 
China. One would require Washington and Moscow to bring down their forces 
close to Chinese levels (and require Beijing to stop building up). In so doing, 
Washington and Moscow would have to reduce nuclear warheads and delivery 
systems, and address non-deployed forces, to eliminate the possibility that they 
could upload warheads on their launchers. This would require Washington 
and Moscow to make deep reductions – close to an eight-fold reduction in the 
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New START ceilings – and present a significant verification challenge, for non-
deployed forces have never been subject to verification. The other option would 
be to allow Beijing to build its forces up or close to U.S. and Russian levels, and 
to allow it to deploy such forces – at present Beijing does not deploy its nuclear 
forces. This would involve allowing Beijing to do a massive build-up and require 
Washington and Moscow to maintain their current force levels.
Managing intermediate-range forces, which traditionally have included both 
nuclear and conventional ground-launched systems of a 500-5,000 km range, 
would present two similar options and be even more complicated to negotiate 
if the plan is symmetric nuclear arms control. Given that China dominates over 
the United States and Russia with intermediate-range forces, one option would 
require Beijing to eliminate its forces, or bring them down to U.S. and Russian 
levels if Washington and Moscow decided to build such systems now that INF-
Treaty restrictions no longer apply. As would be the case for Washington and 
Moscow with regard to strategic forces, this would require Beijing to make deep 
reductions and present a major verification challenge. The other option would 
be to allow Washington and Moscow to build their intermediate-range forces up 
or close to Chinese levels, i.e., allow them to do a massive build-up, and it would 
require Beijing to maintain its current force levels.
Either way, there would be two extra requirements. First, the parallel elimination 
of, or tight restrictions on, U.S. and Russian sea-based cruise missiles. 
Understandably, Beijing would neither want to eliminate/reduce its intermediate 
grounded-based systems (which account for approximately 90 percent of its 
arsenal), nor allow Washington and Moscow to develop such systems without 
also including sea-based cruise missiles in the negotiations; note that air-
launched cruise missiles are subject to New START counting rules. Washington 
and Moscow have large numbers of sea-based cruise missiles, which can be 
deployed on multiple platforms. That means the verification challenges would 
be immense, and, because most of these weapons are mobile, the verification 
regime would need to be global. Second, managing intermediate-range forces as 
described above would have to include simultaneous (or prior) action on strategic 
forces. Beijing, again, understandably, would probably not want to negotiate 
intermediate-range forces if U.S. and Russian strategic superiority endured.
This suggests the United States, Russia, and China would likely not be interested 
in symmetric nuclear arms control. U.S. allies, too, would find such a plan 
unacceptable and the disarmament community would not be pleased either 
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because, at least in some scenarios, this would create a strategic situation in 
which there are more nuclear weapons in the world.
More attractive would be to engage in asymmetric nuclear arms control. As one 
analyst has shown, asymmetric arms control, which she defines as “cooperative 
measures of self-restraint in which states make non-like-for-like exchanges, 
either quantitatively or qualitatively,” is probably the best response to today’s 
nuclear landscape, which is characterized by multipolarity and new weapons 
and technologies besides nuclear forces. It has relevance in a trilateral context.
To manage strategic forces in an asymmetric nuclear arms-control plan, the 
United States and Russia could be required to bring their forces down to a 
certain level (nuclear warheads, delivery systems, and non-deployed forces) in 
exchange for China pledging not to build its forces beyond that level, and not to 
deploy such forces. This arrangement would make clear that Beijing is not given 
a “green light” to build up to the new level reached by Washington and Moscow, 
but, rather, that it is prohibited to build beyond that level. The United States and 
Russia would verify their reductions in a regime à la START, and China would 
be required to engage in transparency measures that provide guarantees that it 
abides by its pledges; as the weaker power, however, China would be allowed to 
maintain a greater degree of opacity than the United States and Russia.
Similarly, to manage intermediate-range forces, China could be required to limit 
or bring down its forces to a certain level in exchange for the United States and 
Russia pledging not to go beyond that level and, at the same time, limiting or 
reducing their sea-based cruise missiles. Because they are at a disadvantage 
vis-à-vis Beijing when it comes to intermediate-range ground-launched forces, 
Washington and Moscow would be allowed to keep some of their sea-based 
systems. In this arrangement, the three countries would be subject to important 
verification and transparency measures. Also, this arrangement would require 
simultaneous (or prior) action on strategic forces because, again, Beijing would 
not want to negotiate on intermediate-range forces so long as Washington and 
Moscow maintain an advantage at the strategic level.
Such an asymmetric arms control plan could be spelled out in two formal 
treaties, with the one on strategic forces preceding the one on intermediate-
range force for the reasons detailed above. Alternatively, there could be one 
single treaty that includes both strategic and intermediate-range forces, sets an 
equal ceiling for them, and lets the three countries decide the “mix” of forces 
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they deem necessary. Either way, such agreements would be challenging to 
negotiate, implement, and verify but could improve U.S., Russian, and Chinese 
security and strategic stability. They would also be more acceptable to U.S. allies 
and better received by the disarmament community because it would create a 
strategic situation in which there are fewer nuclear weapons in the world.
In parallel, a separate arrangement would have to be negotiated in a U.S.-Russia 
context, to address sub-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons, which China does 
not have. Because there is a big disparity between the numbers of U.S. and 
Russian sub-strategic weapons (the United States is estimated to have 230 of 
such weapons and Russia 1,830) and because these weapons play different 
roles in U.S. and Russian security strategies (e.g., Moscow places considerable 
value in its larger arsenal to compensate for conventional inferiority vis-à-vis 
NATO), it would be difficult to conclude an agreement that reduces weapon 
numbers equitably and addresses the security void that these weapons fill.51 
An agreement that imposes an equal ceiling on each side’s weapon numbers 
might appear equitable, but it would require deep reductions on Russian forces 
and few, if any, on U.S. forces. Similarly, an agreement that requires each side to 
reduce its forces by an equal percentage would demand greater reductions on 
Russia’s part. Even if this issue is resolved, it is not clear which weapons would 
be involved because there are many different types, particularly on Russia’s 
side, and most are dual-capable, complicating verification.
To address these issues, some have proposed limits that would cover all types 
of nuclear warheads: those deployed on strategic and sub-strategic forces, and 
those non-deployed.52 This is ambitious, however, and it is not clear that such an 
agreement can be negotiated (or verified).
Assuming definitional issues can be addressed, there are asymmetric arms 
control options available. One would involve trading U.S. readiness to accept a 
limit on non-deployed strategic warheads, where Washington has a numerical 
advantage over Moscow, for Russian readiness to agree to a lower limit on sub-
strategic weapons. Such an exchange could work, particularly given that most 
of Russia’s sub-strategic arsenal appears to be non-deployed.53 Another option 
would involve Washington and NATO capitals accepting Moscow’s request that 
U.S. and Russian sub-strategic arsenals be placed deep into U.S. and Russian 
territories in exchange for bigger reductions by Russia. The price Washington 
and NATO agreeing to the removal of U.S. sub-strategic weapons from Europe 
would involve deep reductions by Russia.54
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Both options would present verification challenges. Until a formal treaty can 
be concluded, however, transparency measures could be concluded, such as 
information exchanges about weapons numbers, their status, and their location. 
Involving China in some of these discussions would be worthwhile, particularly 
if the option of repatriating these weapons deep into national territories is 
considered, as Beijing would want to know where Russian weapons end up (if 
they are brought closer to Chinese territory). Moscow would want to reassure 
Beijing, too.
4.3 TRILATERAL ARMS CONTROL REQUIRES FLEXIBILITY
For trilateral arms control to work, the United States, Russia, and China would 
have to address several other issues, all of which require flexibility. Managing 
defensive systems tops the list because, as mentioned earlier, Russia has 
made clear that it will not conclude another arms control agreement unless 
there is some control over U.S. BMD systems. Given China’s similar concerns 
about such systems, it is likely that Beijing, too, will demand some control. 
Both Russia and China fear not U.S. BMD systems as they exist right now, but 
what they could become. It is the open-ended nature of the U.S. program and 
Washington’s rejection of any limits that are an issue. Moscow and Beijing are 
concerned that the program, now solely designed to negate the threats posed 
by the rogues, may later expand and negate their own second-strike capability; 
they are especially concerned because some in the United States have been 
calling for such a program expansion.
The basis of a compromise, therefore, is obvious: it would involve finding 
agreement on a threshold that distinguishes between the systems (and/or their 
numbers or speed) that can defend against rogue states, and those that have an 
impact on the Russian and Chinese deterrents and undermine strategic stability; 
recall that Washington has stated repeatedly that it does not want to undermine 
the strategic balance with Moscow and Beijing. If agreement on such a threshold 
can be found, the former systems would be authorized, and the latter prohibited.
Finding such an agreement would require the United States, Russia, and China 
to discuss data on BMD systems and conduct joint analyses on their capability to 
assess their impact, or the lack thereof, on strategic stability. The three countries 
could also conduct joint studies on the evolving capabilities of the rogues to 
build trilateral consensus on what is needed to defend against them. This would 
help build a foundation for trilateral BMD cooperation.55
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Taking these steps would require flexibility on all sides. Washington would have 
to accept limits on its BMD program, and Moscow and Beijing that some U.S. 
BMD systems are tied to the evolution of the rogues’ capabilities. That implies 
recognizing that pressure on strategic stability would increase if the rogues grow 
their capabilities because this would create incentives for BMD expansion. That 
would create a formal connection between strategic stability and nonproliferation. 
Managing new technologies and new domains is another critical component. 
Here too, because much remains unknown about their impact, the operating 
word is flexibility.
Discussions about strategic conventional weapons, notably hypersonic weapons, 
are important because these weapons will be more accurate than existing 
weapons and they will have unpredictable trajectories, presenting significant risks 
of inadvertent or unintentional escalation and, according to some, potentially 
emboldening its possessors to conduct a disarming first strike.56 Discussing 
the impact of such technologies is especially appropriate in a trilateral context 
because, at present, only the United States, Russia, and China have such 
weapon programs.57 These discussions could begin in strategic-stability talks, 
which could lead to technical exchanges and transparency measures, preparing 
for integration of such systems into treaties down the line. Per past practices, 
it would be possible to integrate these systems into START-like agreements: in 
New START, all warheads on intercontinental and submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles – nuclear and conventional – count under the warhead limit.
Trilateral discussions about the impact of the space and cyber domains are 
also paramount. Because space support systems have become critical to the 
combat potential of the U.S., Russian, and Chinese armed forces (and those 
of others), anti-satellite weapons have become attractive options. Yet some 
satellites serve to manage the U.S., Russian, and Chinese strategic deterrents 
and their disruption or, worse, their destruction could lead to escalation and 
nuclear use, especially in a crisis. Similarly, while it is difficult to gauge the impact 
of cyberattacks (because little is known about their potential), they, too, could 
lead to escalation to the nuclear level.
Trilateral engagement on space and cyber, therefore, is important. Washington, 
Moscow, and Beijing would benefit from jointly defining “rules of the road” to 
shape their behavior in such domains.58 At present, it is difficult to imagine how 
these issues could be regulated in a formal treaty (or treaties) because we know 
little about the problems that they pose and because verification options are 
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not available. So, developing informal rules and norms appears more realistic, 
and that may also be the case for artificial intelligence, as some are beginning 
to unpack its potential impact on strategic stability.59 For new technologies and 
new domains, the three countries should commit not to attacking one another’s 
nuclear command-and-control systems. They should also work together to 
prevent third actors – states or non-state groups – from meddling with such 
systems to prevent their ability to cause a crisis or unwanted escalation during a 
crisis. This would require Washington, Moscow, and Beijing to establish a quick 
way to communicate. Such a hotline could later morph into a comprehensive 
trilateral crisis-management mechanism.
5. PROSPECTS FOR TRILATERAL ARMS CONTROL
If trilateral arms control is possible, its prospects appear bleak. At present, at least 
in the U.S.-Russia and U.S.-China dyads, the order of the day is competition, not 
cooperation. Even in the Russia-China dyad, where cooperation is flourishing, 
there is little interest in engaging in arms control because of latent competitive 
dynamics. Yet for arms control to work, competitors need to recognize that, while 
competition will continue, cooperation must be given space. As Hedley Bull, one 
the first arms control theorists, highlighted: “Arms control in its broadest sense 
comprises all those acts of military policy in which antagonistic states cooperate 
in the pursuit of common purposes even while they are struggling in the pursuit 
of conflictual ones.”60
The United States, Russia, and China have not – and do not seem about to – come 
together to pursue “common purposes,” either bilaterally or trilaterally. Doing so 
would involve more than stating an interest, as the Trump administration has 
done. It would involve designing a plan, which may be in the works in Washington 
but, for now, is nowhere to be seen.
Regardless, as suggested above, trilateral arms control would involve making 
tough decisions, particularly for the United States. It would require all three parties 
to acknowledge that they are – and commit to remaining – mutually vulnerable, 
even though they are not equally vulnerable. That mean the three countries 
would need to embrace deterrence – MAD – as the operating model for their 
relationships. Yet the United States has always reluctantly accepted deterrence; 
as one analyst has stressed, “Deterrence was never a well-loved concept in the 
United States.”61 This may be especially true today, where the focus of the Trump 
administration’s national-security policy, anchored in “America First” ideology, 
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has been on enhancing the U.S. competitive edge. This leaves little room for 
negotiations, and for making compromises, with competitors, a requirement 
of arms control. Sometimes, it even seems that some only view arms control 
as a means to constrain Russia and China, not the United States. Consider 
Tom Cotton’s recent tweet that “Future arms-control agreements must limit 
both Putin’s massive tactical nuclear arsenal and Xi Jinping’s growing nuclear 
ambitions. Anything less isn’t real arms-control.”62 Of course, it is not clear either 
that Moscow or Beijing would be amendable to negotiations and compromises. 
While they have some specific requests (e.g., BMD restrictions or, for Beijing, 
formal U.S. acknowledgement of mutual vulnerability), for them progress can 
only be made if Washington becomes “more flexible” – a vague request that can 
be (conveniently) interpreted in multiple ways.
That said, it would be wrong to assume nothing can be done, or that it is best 
to wait “until the conditions are right.” At no point were the conditions right 
when there were arms control breakthroughs in the past. Recall that the SALT/
ABM-treaty negotiations proceeded in a less-than-ideal environment – they 
started after the Prague Spring of 1968 and concluded after the bombing of 
North Vietnam in 1972 – and initially had poor prospects. Similarly, INF-Treaty 
negotiations and the START process began after the Soviet-Afghan War, but 
advanced nonetheless and led to two landmark agreements few thought were 
possible at the time. Even when the U.S.-Russia relationship began to deteriorate 
from the late 1990s, despite arms control setbacks, Washington and Moscow 
concluded SORT and New START. Similar breakthroughs are possible, even if 
the goal is now three-way agreements with weapons and technologies besides 
just nuclear forces.
Moreover, there may be less daylight between the U.S., Russian, and Chinese 
positions than is often assumed. One analyst has argued that, for the first time, 
the 2018 NPR implicitly acknowledges Moscow and Beijing’s long-held view that 
non-nuclear threats across domains, including BMD, are essential to strategic 
stability, which could present arms control opportunities.63 Besides, for all the 
talk about Beijing’s lack of incentive to accept trilateral arms control, some 
Chinese scholars have indicated that this would depend on what is expected 
of China and, presumably, what China would receive in return. As one such 
scholar has explained: “if the proposed trilateral negotiations are not about the 
number of weapons but strategic stability, China should get on board as soon as 
possible.”64 This suggests progress is possible.
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6. CONCLUSION
One thing is certain: trilateral arms control will not happen overnight. It will take 
time, probably years, for U.S., Russian, and Chinese officials to negotiate viable 
agreements. This means work should begin now. Because they have experience, 
Washington and Moscow should jointly approach Beijing and opt, for instance, 
to share their practices of exchanging missile pre-launch notifications and flight-
test telemetry data. Additionally, U.S. and Russian officials could invite their 
Chinese counterparts to observer U.S.-Russian on-site inspections. This would 
help build habits of trilateral cooperation before more substantive work can 
begin. Until then, Washington and Moscow should preserve the current arms 
control architecture, insofar as it remains relevant to manage today’s realities. 
New START, which will expire in February 2021 but can be extended for an 
additional five years, fits that bill. From a U.S. perspective, extension should be 
a no-brainer: the treaty has helped enhance U.S. security and will capture two 
of Russia’s new strategic systems, the Sarmat heavy intercontinental ballistic 
missile and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle.65 That is why General John 
Hyten, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and former commander of 
the U.S. Strategic Command), has said that he is “a big supporter of the New 
START agreement.”66 The good news is that Moscow has now indicated its 
willingness to extend it immediately and without preconditions.67 The ball is 
now in Washington’s court. The Trump administration should respond positively 
to Moscow’s invitation and extend New START now, while at the same time 
launching a strong diplomatic push for trilateral arms control negotiations to 
begin shortly thereafter.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank Vincent Manzo for his comments on an early draft 
of this paper.
Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
29
Endnotes
1 Trump, Donald (2018). Tweet from 3 December 2018, available at https:// 
 twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1069584730880974849?lang=de 
 (accessed 15 February 2020). 
2 The White House (2019). Remarks by President Trump in State of the  
 Union Address, Washington, DC, 6 February 2019, available at https:// 
 www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump- 
 state-union-address-2/ (accessed 15 February 2020).
3 Reif, Kingston & Taheran, Shervin (2019). U.S. Seeks Broader Nuclear  
 Arms Pact. Arms Control Today, May 2019, available at https://www.arms 
 control.org/act/2019-05/news/us-seeks-broader-nuclear-arms-pact  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
4 Sonne, Paul & Hudson, John (2019). Trump orders staff to prepare  
 arms control push with Russia and China. Washington Post, 26 April 2019,  
 available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
 trump-orders-staff-to-prepare-arms-control-push-with-russia-and-china/
 2019/04/25/c7f05e04-6076-11e9-9412-daf3d2e67c6d_story.html  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
5 Joseph, Robert & Edelman, Eric (2019). New Directions in Arms  
 Control. National Review, 29 April 2019, available at https://www.national 
 review.com/2019/04/arms-control-treaties-russian-chinese-nuclear-forces/  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
6 Cotton, Tom (2019). Senators Cotton, Cornun, and Rep. Cheney Intro- 
 duce New START Treaty Improvement Act, Press Release, 13 May 2019,  
 available at https://www.cotton.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=1121  
 (accessed 15 February 2020); Thompson, Andrea & Trachtenberg,  
 David (2019). Hearing on The Future of Arms Control Post-Intermediate- 
 Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign  
 Relations, 15 May 2019, available at https://www.foreign.senate.gov/ 
 hearings/the-future-of-arms-control-post-intermediate-range-nuclear- 
 forces-treaty (accessed 15 February 2020).
IFSH Research Report #002
30
7 Holland, Steve & Alexander, David (2019). Trump says he, Putin dis- 
 cussed nuclear deal that would reduce weapons. Reuters, 3 May 2019,  
 available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-russia-nuclear/ 
 trump-says-he-putin-discussed-nuclear-deal-that-would-reduce-weapons- 
 idUSKCN1S91U1 (accessed 15 February 2020); Ministry of Foreign  
 Affairs, the People’s Republic of China (2019). Foreign Ministry  
 Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference, Beijing, 6 May  
 2019, available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/nanhai/eng/fyrbt_1/ 
 t1661163.htm (accessed 15 February 2020).
8 Beijing rejected trilateral arms control again on 16 May, 5 November, and  
 11 December 2019, see: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s  
 Republic of China (2019). Regular Press Conferences of the Chinese  
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ 
 eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/ (accessed 15 February 2020).  
 Beijing had also rejected INF multilateralization on 5 December 2018, see:  
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People’s Republic of China (2019).  
 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Confe- 
 rence on December 5, 2018, available at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_ 
 eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/t1619268.shtml  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
9 Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt (2019). Status of World Nuclear  
 Forces. Federation of American Scientists, May 2019, available at https:// 
 fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
10 Ford, Christopher (2019). Remarks on The P5, the ‘N5,’ and the NPT  
 Review Conference. Wilton Park Nonproliferation Conference,  
 16 December 2019.
11 Johnson, Jenna & Troianovski, Anton (2018). Trump congratulates Putin 
 on his reelection, discusses U.S.-Russian ‘arms race.’ Washington Post, 20  
 March 2018, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/trump- 
 congratulates-putin-on-his-reelection-kremlin-says/2018/03/20/379effd0- 
 2c57-11e8-8dc9-3b51e028b845_story.html  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
31
12 Feinberg, Scott (2017). Donald Trump Angled for Soviet Posting in the  
 1980s, Says Nobel Prize Winner (Exclusive). The Hollywood Reporter, 26 
 May 2017, available at https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/donald- 
 trump-angled-soviet-posting-1980s-says-nobel-prize-winner-1006312  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
13 The White House (2017). National Security Strategy of the United States  
 of America (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), p. 25. Besides the NSS,  
 the U.S. Department of Defense’s National Defense Strategy and Nuclear  
 Posture Review from 2018 and its Indo-Pacific Strategy Report from 2019  
 as well as the U.S. Department of State’s “A Free and Open Indo-Pacific  
 Report” from 2019, focus on competition with China.
14 U.S. Department of Defense (2018). Nuclear Posture Review (Washing- 
 ton, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), pp. 72-73; Manzo, Vince (2019).  
 Nuclear Arms Control without a Treaty? Risks and Options after New  
 START (Washington, DC: CNA, 2019), pp. 16-34.
15 There is a debate about whether NWS are legally required by the NPT to  
 lead on disarmament. The matter was settled politically in 1995 when the  
 NPT was extended indefinitely. The document “Principles and Objectives  
 for Nuclear Non-Pproliferation and Disarmament” requires “the determined 
 pursuit by the nuclear weapon states of systematic and progressive efforts  
 to reduce nuclear weapons globally, with the ultimate goal of eliminating  
 those weapons, and by all states of general and complete disarmament  
 under strict and effective international control.” See: United Nations  
 (1995). 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty  
 on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Principles and Objectives  
 for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, NPT/CONF.1995/L.5,  
 9 May 1995.
16 U.S. efforts to prioritize Asia began in the 2000s with George W. Bush and  
 crystalized with Barack Obama’s “rebalance to Asia.”
17 Kravchenko, Stepan & Meyer, Henry (2019). Russia Welcomes Trump  
 Offer of New Nuclear Pact, Awaits Details. Bloomberg, 7 February 2019,  
 available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-07/russia- 
 welcomes-trump-offer-of-new-nuclear-pact-awaits-details  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
IFSH Research Report #002
32
18 Hoell, Maximilian (2019). The P5 Process: Ten Years On. European  
 Leadership Network, 25 September 2019, available at https://www.europe 
 anleadershipnetwork.org/policy-brief/the-p5-process-ten-years-on/  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
19 Arbatov, Alexey (2017). Understanding the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Schism,  
 Survival, 59(2): 33-66.
20 Long, Austin and Green, Brendan (2015). Stalking the Secure Second  
 Strike: Intelligence, Counterforce, and Nuclear Strategy, Journal of  
 Strategic Studies, 38(1-2): 38-73.
21 Long, Austin (2018). Russian Nuclear Forces and Prospects for Arms  
 Control, Testimony presented before the House of Representatives  
 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonprolifera- 
 tion, and Trade, 21 June 2018, available at https://www.rand.org/pubs/ 
 testimonies/CT495.html (accessed 15 February 2020).
22 When signing the Treaty, the Russians issued a unilateral statement in 
 dicating that were U.S. BMD developments to threaten their strategic  
 forces, Moscow would consider withdrawing.
23 Roberts, Brad (2015). The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st  
 Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), pp. 119-120.
24 Putin promised to “snap back hard” in a March 2014 address, see:  
 President of Russia (2014). Address by President of the Russian  
 Federation, 18 March 2014, available at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/ 
 president/news/20603 (accessed 15 February 2020). He unveiled Russia’s 
 new strategic weapons on March 2018: a long-range nuclear-powered and  
 nuclear-armed autonomous underwater vehicle, the Status-6 or Poseidon,  
 capable of striking coastal cities or other targets from transoceanic ranges, 
 and an intercontinental-range nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise  
 missile, the Burvestnik, which will hold the U.S. homeland at risk.
25 These weapons include a low explosive yield option for submarine- 
 launched ballistic missiles, and the restoration of nuclear, sea-launched  
 cruise missiles. U.S. Department of Defense (2018), op. cit., pp. 52-55.
26 Russia’s 2016 Foreign Policy Concept links arms control progress to  
 including BMD, see: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian  
 Federation (2016). Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation  
 (approved by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on  
Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
33
 November 30, 2016), available at https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/ 
 official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248  
 (accessed 15 February 2020). Putin also said that because of U.S. BMD  
 developments “all agreements signed within the framework of New START  
 are now gradually being devalued.” President of Russia (2018).  
 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly, 1 March 2018, available  
 at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56957  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
27 The Chinese arsenal was meant to be a national asset and a contribution  
 to the socialist camp’s collective deterrent capability. Goldstein, Avery  
 (2000). Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century: China, Britain, France, 
 and the Enduring Legacy of the Nuclear Revolution (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
 University Press, 2000), p. 111.
28 Burr, William & Richelson, Jeffrey T. (2000-2001). Whether to “Strangle  
 the Baby in the Cradle”: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear  
 Program, 1960–64, 25(3): 54-99.
29 References to China’s “self-defense nuclear strategy” first appeared in the  
 2006 Defense White Paper, see: Ministry of National Defense, The  
 People’s Republic of China (2006). China’s National Defense in 2006,  
 available at http://eng.mod.gov.cn/Database/WhitePapers/2006.htm  
 (accessed 15 February 2020). After its first nuclear test, China declared:  
 “The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China will never  
 at any time and under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear  
 weapons.” China’s NFU commitment has been emphasized in all official  
 documents since. Beijing has only focused on developing “the minimum  
 means of reprisal,” i.e., enough for a nuclear counterstrike. Quoted from  
 Lewis, Jeffrey (2007). The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search  
 for Security in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2007).
30 The United States never embraced China without restraint. As it engaged,  
 Washington was also hedging, see: Friedberg, Aaron L. (2018).  
 Competing with China. Survival, 60(3): 7-64.
31 Ibid., p. 11.
32 Mingfu, Liu (2015). The China Dream: Great Power Thinking and Strategic 
 Posture in the Post-American Era (Beijing: CN Time Books, 2015).
33 Kristensen, Hans M. & Korda, Matt (2019). Chinese Nuclear Forces,  
 2019. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 75(4): 171-178.
IFSH Research Report #002
34
34 Wheeler, Michael O. (2012). Nuclear Parity with China? (Washington, DC:  
 IDA, 2012).
35 Until recently, nuclear dialogue was active at the track-1.5 level. Such  
 dialogue was run by the Pacific Forum and Naval Postgraduate School on  
 the U.S. side, and the China Foundation for International and Strategic  
 Studies and China Arms Control and Disarmament Association on the  
 Chinese side.
36 Talmadge, Caitlin (2019). The U.S.-China Nuclear Relationship: Why  
 Competition Is Likely to Intensify (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution,  
 2019).
37 Interview by the author, Washington, DC, July 2019.
38 Lo, Bobo (2008). Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New  
 Geopolitics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008).
39 Goldstein (2000), op. cit., pp. 71-76.
40 President of Russia (2019). Valdai Discussion Club session, available  
 at http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
41 President of Russia (2019). Joint Statement by the Russian Federation  
 and the People’s Republic of China on strengthening global strategic  
 stability in the modern era, 5 June 2019, available at http://kremlin.ru/ 
 supplement/5412 (accessed 15 February 2020). [in Russian]
42 The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (2014). Approved by  
 the President of the Russian Federation on December 25, 2014, No. Pr.- 
 2976, available at https://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
43 Arbatov, Alexey & Dvorkin, Vladimir (2013). The Great Strategic Triangle  
 (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2013), pp. 12-13.
44 Roberts, Brad (2002). Tripolar Stability: The Future of Nuclear Relations  
 Among the United States, Russia, and China (Washington, DC: IDA, 2002),  
 pp. 38-42.
Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
35
45 Schelling, Thomas C. & Halperin, Morton H. (1961). Strategy and Arms  
 Control (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1961).
46 Colby, Elbridge A. & Gerson, Michael S. (2013). Strategic Stability:  
 Contending Interpretations (Washington, DC: SSI and U.S. Army War  
 College Press, 2013).
47 There is a debate about whether first-strike stability means preventing  
 nuclear first use to disarm an opponent or preventing any nuclear first use,  
 including limited first use. The convention wisdom leans towards the  
 former.
48 Williams, Heather (2019). Asymmetric Arms Control and Strategic  
 Stability: Scenarios for Limiting Hypersonic Glide Vehicles, Journal of  
 Strategic Studies, 42(6): 789-813.
49 After the Cold War, while some have redefined MAD to account for the  
 changed realities, its key features have not changed.
50 Kahn, Herman (1960). On Thermonuclear War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton  
 University Press, 1960), p. 537.
51 Congressional Research Service (2019). Nonstrategic Nuclear  
 Weapons (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019),  
 pp. 37-42.
52 Pifer, Steven (2010). The Next Round: The United States and Nuclear  
 Arms Reductions after New START (Washington, DC: Brookings  
 Institution, 2010), p. 25.
53 Ibid., p. 23.
54 Ibid., p. 20.
55 To alleviate Russian concerns, Washington welcomed BMD cooperation  
 in the NATO context. At the trilateral level, BMD cooperation could build  
 upon these efforts.
IFSH Research Report #002
36
56 Acton, James M. (2017). Entanglement: Russian and Chinese Perspec- 
 tives on Non-Nuclear weapons and Nuclear Risks (Washington, DC:  
 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017); Acton, James M.  
 (2016). Russia and Strategic Conventional Weapons: Concerns and  
 Responses, Nonproliferation Review, 22(2): 141-154; Lieber, Keir &  
 Press, Daryl G. (2017). The New Era of Counterforce: Technological  
 Change and the Future of Nuclear Deterrence, International Security, 41(4): 
 9-49.
57 Congressional Research Service (2019). Hypersonic Weapons: 
 Background and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional  
 Research Service, 2019).
58 This effort has begun at the track-1.5 level. For the latest (published) draft  
 of the memorandum on “Rules of the Road in Nuclear, Space, and  
 Cyber Domains,” see: Cossa, Ralph A., Glosserman, Brad & Santoro,  
 David (2016). Reaching an Inflection Point? The Tenth China-U.S. Dialogue 
 on Strategic Nuclear Dynamics, Issues & Insights, 16(20): C-1.
59  Gasser, Paige, Loss, Rafael, Reddie, Andrew (2018). Assessing the  
 Strategic Effects of Artificial Intelligence (Livermore, CA: Center for Global  
 Security Research, 2018); Boulanin, Vincent (2019). The Impact of  
 Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk (Stockholm:  
 SIPRI, 2019); Horowitz, Michael C., Scharre, Paul & Velez-Green,  
 Alexander (2019). A Stable Nuclear Future? The Impact on Autonomous  
 Systems and Artificial Intelligence, 11 December 2019, arXiv:1912.05291,  
 available at https://arxiv.org/abs/1912.05291  
 (accessed 15 February 2020).
60 Bull, Hedley (1965). The Control of the Arms Race (New York: Praeger,  
 1965), p. xiv.
61 Long, Austin (2008). Deterrence: From Cold War to Long War (Santa  
 Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), p. vii.
62 Cotton, Tom (2019). Tweet from 6 December 2019, available at https:// 
 twitter.com/SenTomCotton/status/1202954273371443200 (accessed 15  
 February 2020).
63 Williams, Heather (2018). Strategic Stability, Uncertainty and the Future  
 of Arms Control, Survival, 60(2): 45-54.
Trilateral Arms Control? Perspectives from Washington, Moscow, and Beijing
37
64 Fan, Jishe (2019). Trilateral Negotiations on Arms Control? Not Time Yet.  
 China-U.S. Focus, 13 September 2019, available at https://www.chinaus 
 focus.com/peace-security/trilateral-negotiations-on-arms-control-not-time- 
 yet (accessed 15 February 2020).
65 Neither the Poseidon nor the Burvestnik are expected to become  
 operational until after 2026 at the earliest, i.e., after an extended New  
 START expires.
66 U.S. House of Representatives (2017). Statement of John E. Hyten,  
 Commander United States Strategic Command Before the House  
 Committee on Armed Services , Military Assessment of Nuclear Weapons  
 Requirements, 8 March 2017, available at https://docs.house.gov/ 
 meetings/AS/AS00/20170308/105640/HHRG-115-AS00-Wstate-HytenU 
 SAFJ-20170308.pdf (accessed 15 February 2020);  
 U.S. Strategic Command (2019). U.S. Senate Committee on Armed  
 Services on March 1 2019, available at https://www.stratcom.mil/Media/ 
 Speeches/Article/1771903/us-strategic-command-and-us-northern- 
 command-sasc-testimony/ (accessed 15 February 2020).
67 Tass (2019). Russia Ready to Include Avangard, Sarmat Systems in New  
 START after its Extension. TASS, 22 December 2019, available at https:// 
 tass.com/defense/1102179 (accessed 15 February 2020).
IFSH Research Report #002
38
1. INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade since 2007, Russia had been insisting that the bilateral 
U.S.-Russian arms control model must be transformed into a multilateral one, 
in particular regarding the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty of 
1987 and the follow-on to the Treaty on Measures of Further Reduction and 
Elimination of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START of 2010). This position was 
initially advanced by President Vladimir Putin in his famous 2007 Munich speech 
in relation to the INF Treaty1 and later regarding the follow-on to New START. In 
2012, Putin said: “We will not disarm unilaterally … All nuclear powers should 
participate in this process. We cannot disarm while other nuclear powers are 
building up their arms.”2
Until recently the U.S. position on this subject had been generally in favor (except 
about including Britain and France), but not too persistent. At some point, in 
2007, the two states advanced a joint resolution in the United Nations in favor of 
making the INF Treaty multilateral,3 but received no positive response.
With the unraveling crisis of arms control, the situation has now radically 
changed. Donald Trump’s administration suddenly became a devoted partisan 
of multilateral nuclear arms control, while Vladimir Putin’s government has taken 
a negative attitude towards this proposal. The U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty 
has been justified (besides the alleged Russian violations) by the necessity to 
counter China’s medium-range missiles deployment and the need for China’s 
participation in any possible new treaty on this subject. Likewise, Washington’s 
reluctance to extend New START and the prospects of a follow-on agreement 
were linked to China’s joining strategic arms limitations and reductions.
The Russian position, on the contrary, shifted to the long-standing position of 
all seven smaller nuclear-armed states: that the United States and Russia have 
to proceed in a bilateral mode since they possess the overwhelming portion of 
the nuclear weapons of the world. By taking this position, Moscow rendered 
full support to China’s rejection of U.S. proposals to join any new version of the 
INF or START follow-on treaty. In September 2019, President Putin declared this 
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U-turn: “Now the U.S.A. has put forward a new version, they want to engage 
the Peoples Republic of China in this joint work. But Chinese are arguing quite 
reasonably that Chinese nuclear potential is much lower that than Russian or 
American and they do not understand what they should reduce if they already 
have fewer delivery vehicles and fewer warheads. This position looks sufficiently 
logical.”4
It is by no means clear whether the current shifts in U.S. or Russia’s arms 
control stances deserve a serious strategic analysis or are just declaratory 
tactics camouflaging motives of a different kind. Nevertheless, the problems 
of multilateral nuclear arms control will remain on the agenda of international 
security for the foreseeable future. 
2. THE ASIA-PACIFIC STRATEGIC TRIANGLE
The great triangle of the Asia-Pacific region formed by the United States, Russia, 
and China is of particular importance, in economic, geopolitical, and military-
strategic terms. Obviously, this triangle is not even-sided. On the one hand, 
Russia and the United States as well as the United States and China are being 
pulled deeper into geopolitical, military and economic confrontation. On the 
other hand, Russia and China are moving closer towards a political and military 
alliance – de-facto if not de-jure. In line with this trend, mutual nuclear deterrence 
relationships between Moscow and Washington, as well as between Washington 
and Beijing are getting more conspicuous, while the nature of nuclear relations 
between Moscow and Beijing, extremely tense until the late-1980s, is becoming 
increasingly mute.
This triangular relationship has an important regional dimension as well, in that 
other nuclear states (India, Pakistan, and North Korea) adjoin it in Asia. Besides, 
the great triangle is directly or indirectly involved in military, political, territorial, 
and economic relations and conflicts in the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia.
2.1 THE RUSSIAN-AMERICAN DIMENSION
The present crises in U.S.-Russian relations started earlier than the conflict 
in and around Ukraine in 2014. At its origins was Moscow’s dissatisfaction 
with the post-Cold War political order. This frustration for many years had 
been privately delivered to Western counterparts until publicly expressed in 
Putin’s Munich speech of 2007.5 After Putin’s return to the Kremlin in 2012, 
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Moscow decided to stop talking and start acting to do away with the unequal 
model of relations with the United States by reasserting Russian traditional 
geopolitical spheres of influence and positions of military superpower. In 
response to Crimea in 2014, the United States and its allies imposed economic 
sanctions and revived the strategy of isolation, containment, and arms build-
up against Moscow. This U-turn in Russian-Western relations in just a few 
years has drastically changed the relations of the previous thirty years and 
brought them to a highly dangerous state. In the realm of strategic interactions 
it is characterized by three trends in the spheres of arms control, weapons 
programs, and military doctrines.
First, in the arms control sphere the pivotal point came with the United States’ and 
then Russia’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty in August 2019. After Washington 
had denounced the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, the end of INF 
removed the second remaining cornerstone of the nuclear arms limitations 
and reductions regime, which was launched by the 1991 START-I Treaty. The 
collapse of INF happened against the background of an eight-year break in U.S.-
Russian negotiations on any START follow-on agreement, which was the longest 
pause in fifty years of strategic arms talks. Although both parties fulfilled their 
reduction obligations under New START by the February 2018 deadline (though 
with a number of reservations from Russia), the Treaty will expire in February 
2021. The chances for successful negotiations on a new agreement are quite 
bleak given the deep disagreements between the two parties on ballistic missile 
defenses and other important issues. Meanwhile, the U.S. administration up to 
now has been reluctant to extend New START until 2026, which, in line with 
Article XIV.2, can be done once for up to five years. In contrast, Russia is clearly 
in favor of extending the Treaty.
These developments would undoubtedly damage the global nuclear 
nonproliferation regime and undermine the 2020 Review Conference of the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). There are growing 
chances of a collapse of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), 
which was de-facto operational for twenty-three years, despite not having entered 
into legal force because of the refusal of the United States and a number of other 
nations to ratify it. The negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) 
and on the prohibition of space arms, which have been stalled for many years in 
Geneva, are dying a quiet death. 
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The main reason for this crisis is not the technical complexity of strategic 
relationships, or the turmoil in world order. The principle factor is a lack of 
appreciation for arms control as one of the highest national security priorities by 
the new generation of political and military elites on both sides.
Second, in terms of the number of warheads (14,500), the nuclear forces of 
Russia and the United States account for about 92 percent of the world’s 
nuclear weapons stockpile.6 On the other hand, during the last 30 years, starting 
with the INF and START-I Treaties, the strategic nuclear forces of both Russia 
and the United States have been consistently and deeply reduced: by about 
three times the number of deployed delivery vehicles and by 6 times the number 
of warheads.7 Sub-strategic (tactical) nuclear arms have been cut even more 
drastically. In parallel, the pace of modernization of their forces had been going 
at an unprecedentedly slow and narrow pace until recently. During the same 
period, the nuclear capabilities of third countries (primarily of China, India, and 
Pakistan) have been growing steadily both in quantity and quality.
Due to the INF and START treaties of the last 30 years as well as reasonable 
modernization programs, Russia and the United States have maintained a 
classic relationship based on mutual nuclear deterrence and approximate 
strategic parity. Moreover, in line with the agreed principles of strategic stability, 
formalized in the U.S.-Soviet joint declaration of 1990, their nuclear balance has 
become highly robust at much lower levels of forces in a sense of “removing 
incentives for a first nuclear strike”.8
 
Compared to the situation before START-I, the proportion of highly survivable 
weapons systems9 increased from 30-40 percent to 60-70 percent. As a result, 
most realistic models of hypothetical nuclear exchanges demonstrate that 
neither side is able to destroy more than 50 percent of the strategic forces of the 
other, while expending 30 percent more warheads than the number destroyed.10 
Last but not least, the level of transparency and predictability has been 
unprecedented. While implementing New START, the parties exchanged about 
300 on-sight inspections and 18,000 notifications about the state, activities, and 
changes to their strategic forces.11
Nonetheless, at present Russia and the United States are “smoothly” getting 
engaged in a new large-scale nuclear arms race cycle. This competition, unlike 
during the Cold War, will be augmented by rivalry in long-range precision-guided 
offensive and defensive conventional systems, conventional and nuclear medium-
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range weapons, hypersonic missiles, as well as by a race in the development of 
space arms, autonomous drones with Artificial Intelligence (AI) capabilities, and 
cyber warfare assets.
In particular, a follow-on generation of strategic weapon systems was declared 
in the famous March 1, 2018, address by President Putin.12 Russia is deploying 
the Avangard strategic boost-glide hypersonic system using old SS-19 ICBMs as 
a booster and the Kinzhal air-launched hypersonic intermediate-range missiles. 
The development and testing program includes further the new Sarmat heavy-
type SS-30 ICBM, the Poseidon long-range nuclear torpedo, and the Burevestnik 
nuclear-powered intercontinental nuclear cruise missile.
This massive effort is justified as a response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty in 2002 and ensuing ballistic missile defense programs.13 In particular, 
allegedly to assure defense penetration, Sarmat may fly to the continental United 
States across the southern polar circle, Avangard will follow a variable trajectory 
in the stratosphere, Poseidon will be able to go at a depth of 1,000 meters and 
explode near U.S. shores to create a giant tsunami-wave,14 Burevestnik can 
indefinitely loiter in the air while choosing its target with the help of AI, and 
Kinzhal may instantly attack Aegis-ashore bases in Romania and Poland.
After the denunciation of the INF Treaty, and in line with the Soviet/Russian 
multiple systems tradition, land-based versions of the intermediate-range Kalibr-
type cruise missiles, new intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) of the SS-
26 Rubezh type, and hypersonic medium-range missiles may be deployed in 
response to future U.S. land-based intermediate-range missiles. According to 
some unofficial proposals, new IRBMs might even be deployed in Venezuela, 
Nicaragua, and Cuba.
All this is allegedly needed despite more than 2,000 presently deployed strategic 
nuclear weapons (by actual loading of heavy bombers) and almost 2,000 
sub-strategic nuclear arms. Whether the above weapons program represents 
excessive nuclear posturing or a wise enhancement of deterrence, the 
accelerating pace of the bilateral arms race will most likely undermine strategic 
stability. This effect transcends through innovations of the military doctrines of 
the two superpowers.
Third, during the last decade there has been a tacit but profound transformation 
of U.S. and Russian nuclear postures that had emerged by the late 1980s. 
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Back then, leaders came to recognize that “nuclear war cannot be won and 
must never be fought”.15 Based on this understanding, the concept of strategic 
stability was elaborated as a state of strategic relationship, which removes 
incentives for a nuclear first strike.16 Although never formalized, there emerged 
a shared understanding that any use of nuclear weapons, even if limited, would 
most probably escalate to global mutual annihilation. These ideas formed the 
foundation for a series of strategic reduction treaties during the 1990s and 2000s.
In contrast, current strategic thinking in the United States and Russia seems 
to be shifting. Now, the goal is to control nuclear escalation and to compel the 
opponent to capitulate or step back in an armed conflict.17 The main novelty 
of the current U.S. nuclear strategy and weapons programs is the concept of 
a limited or selective nuclear war.18 The concept originates in the 1960s when 
massive numbers of tactical nuclear arms had been deployed to Europe and 
Asia. From the early 1970s onwards, the United States promoted various options 
for selective and limited strikes against Soviet military targets,19 but since the late 
1980s this concept all but disappeared from official U.S. strategic documents. 
However, in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the concept was again emphasized 
more forcefully than ever during the last thirty years: 
“Recent Russian statements on this evolving nuclear weapons doctrine appear 
to lower the threshold for Moscow’s first-use of nuclear weapons … To address 
these types of challenges and preserve deterrence stability, the United States 
will enhance the flexibility and range of its tailored deterrence options”.20 This 
concept would rely on the whole panoply of sea-, air-, and possibly medium-
range land-based nuclear and dual-purpose systems.21
Russia played with the very same idea in 2003, when an official document of 
the Ministry of Defense announced plans for the “de-escalation of aggression 
… [by] the threat to deliver or by the actual delivery of strikes of various intensity 
using conventional and (or) nuclear weapons.” As such, the document assumed 
the possibility of “dosed combat employment of selected components of the 
Strategic Deterrence Force”.22
The current Russian Military Doctrine postulates: “The Russian Federation shall 
reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and 
other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well 
as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of 
conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy”. The 
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purpose of a nuclear strike is defined as “the infliction of the assigned level of 
damage on an aggressor in any conditions”.23
These formulas do not contain a formal concept of limited nuclear war, but do 
not exclude it either. It is not clear when and how exactly the “existence of the 
state” can be considered in jeopardy and what “level of damage” to the enemy 
might be interpreted as sufficient. However, it has been regularly discussed 
in professional military circles, including those associated with governmental 
institutions, which advocated “the limited nature of a first nuclear strike, which is 
designed not to harden, but rather to sober up an aggressor, to force it to halt its 
attack and move to negotiations”.24
In terms of practical, in contrast to declaratory, nuclear planning, the Chief of 
the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, General Valery Gerasimov 
remarked: “The policy of military threats from our Western ‘partners’ makes 
us respond to a threat with a threat and plan in perspective delivering strikes 
against the centers of decision-making and launchers for using cruise missiles 
against sites on Russian territory”.25 Apparently, this formula implies preemptive 
and selective strikes without specifying nuclear or conventional.
Nonetheless, in his March 1, 2018 speech, President Putin said: “Any use of 
nuclear weapons against Russia or its allies, weapons of small, medium or any 
yield at all, will be considered as a nuclear attack on this country. Retaliation will 
be immediate, with all the attendant consequences”.26 This might mean that, in 
contrast to the U.S. nuclear doctrine, limited nuclear war is not envisioned in 
the Russian doctrine. However, an unequivocal statement rejecting selective 
first nuclear use as its own strategy has never emanated from official Russian 
circles.
The history of the nuclear arms race and of nuclear doctrines shows that in 
many cases the Soviet Union, and later Russia, followed the U.S. example. No 
matter how much deterrence concepts are used to justify new capabilities, they 
actually lower the nuclear threshold and increase the likelihood of armed conflict 
between the superpowers escalating into a nuclear war.
Still worse, a serious discussion of delegating the decision to launch nuclear 
weapons based on AI is again underway, recalling the notorious “Dead Hand” 
concept from Soviet times.27 From a moral, political, and strategic point of view, 
this might sound like the ultimate absurdity. Nonetheless, given the trends of 
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technological innovations and the propensity for nuclear war fighting in current 
strategic thinking, it is in no way impossible.
2.2 THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA
In contrast to its relations with Russia, the United States has never officially 
acknowledged mutual nuclear deterrence with China or accepted that China 
would eventually achieve parity with the United States. Apparently, Washington 
does not intend to offer such relations as a “gift” to China, the emerging 
superpower of the 21st century.
China, for its part, insists on its right for mutual deterrence with the United States, 
with an emphasis on what in the West is called “minimum nuclear deterrence”. 
Beijing has been gradually increasing the number and survivability of its ICBMs 
and SLBMs, nuclear and precision-guided conventional intermediate- and short-
range ballistic and cruise missiles.
Besides, China has the largest military shipbuilding (except aircraft carriers) and 
combat aircraft manufacturing (except heavy bombers) programs in the world. 
Its Air Force and naval aviation command about 4,000 aircraft of various types, 
including 700 of the newest models.28 The Chinese Navy is the world’s second 
largest after the United States and the largest in the Western Pacific possessing 
eight nuclear attack and 60 diesel submarines, 80 large combat surface ships, 
50 large and medium-size amphibious ships and 90 small corvettes and missile 
boats.29 China is increasing its anti-access/area-denial capabilities, which 
provide it with expanding sea- and air-control in the Western Pacific.30
 In the nuclear realm, independent foreign experts estimate that as many as 
about 280 nuclear warheads are attributed to all legs and classes of China’s 
nuclear forces.31 During peacetime, most of these warheads would be stockpiled 
separately from the missiles. However, China has also adopted a continuous 
duty cycle for the DF-31/31A (CSS-10) ICBM missile brigades, clearly keeping 
these systems ready for immediate use upon the authorization of the Chinese 
political leadership. This means that the missiles in their launch containers will 
have permanently coupled nuclear warheads.
In contrast, reputable Russian experts have estimated that since the early 1960s 
China has generated 40 tons of enriched weapons-grade uranium and 10 tons 
of plutonium, which would be enough to produce 3,600 nuclear warheads.32 
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However, most likely half of this fissile material is being held in stocks and half of 
the 1,500–1,800 warheads that have been produced since then are in storage. 
Thus, up to 800–900 warheads and bombs could be available for operational 
deployment on delivery vehicles of various types.33
Foreign news agencies and independent experts have periodically reported 
that the Chinese military has been building an extensive system of underground 
tunnels. These tunnels, which extend for several thousand kilometers, could be 
capable of accommodating many dozens or even hundreds of backup ground-
mobile launchers with ballistic and cruise missiles. No other purpose has yet 
been identified for such extensive earthworks.
American estimates forecast rapid growth of China’s nuclear force during the next 
decade. According to Robert Ashley, Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence 
Agency, “Over the next decade, China is likely to at least double the size of 
its nuclear stockpile in the course of implementing the most rapid expansion 
and diversification of its nuclear arsenal in China’s history”.34 Depending on the 
starting point, this future nuclear force level might be between 600 and 1,800 
warheads.
Even though such a high level is probably an exaggeration, the Chinese 
nuclear capability has probably been underestimated by the international 
strategic community. It appears that in all likelihood China has already the 
third largest nuclear weapons arsenal after the United States and Russia. In 
terms of its nuclear force level, and the technical and economic capability to 
build up its nuclear arsenal rapidly, it is possible that China surpasses all other 
nuclear weapons states combined, except the United States and Russia. Last 
but not least, China is the only nation of the five NPT nuclear weapons states 
and a permanent member of the UN Security Council which is totally opaque 
regarding any official data on its present nuclear forces and their development 
programs. In the past such reservation could have been justified on grounds of 
China’s nuclear inferiority vis-à-vis the two nuclear superpowers and Beijing’s 
vulnerability concerns. Nowadays, however, such posturing looks threatening 
to China’s neighbors, in particular since Chinese doctrinal documents contain 
rather harsh official statements reflecting its rising military power and expanding 
geopolitical ambitions.35
China’s official nuclear doctrine, coupled with total secrecy regarding its nuclear 
forces, probably has little to do with practical policy, but represents a massive 
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propaganda effort, much like that of the Soviet Union from the 1960s until the 
late 1980s. For strategic professionals, studying American nuclear posture 
documents is an interesting job. Reading Russian military doctrines requires 
a lot of patience. But exploring Chinese defense statements is an agonizing 
experience indeed. The 2019 White Paper underlines the fundamental principle 
of its defense policy: “To strengthen China’s national defense and military in the 
new era, it is imperative to comprehensively implement Xi Jinping’s thinking on 
strengthening the military, thoroughly deliver on Xi Jinping’s thinking on military 
strategy”.36 Accordingly, the Paper defines China’s military doctrine, which 
“adheres to the principles of defense, self-defense and post-strike response, 
and adopts active defense”. It highlights that “we will not attack unless we are 
attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked.”37 It further declares: “China 
is always committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any 
time and under any circumstances, and not using or threatening to use nuclear 
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones 
unconditionally … China does not engage in any nuclear arms race with any 
other country and keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required 
for national security.”38
Nonetheless, the situation with China is much more contradictory, than its 
doctrine of nuclear No First Use would portray. It is commonly believed that a 
nuclear power that makes a nuclear no first use pledge should rely on a second-
strike capability. However, according to information available abroad, China’s 
deployed nuclear forces are too small and vulnerable (about 148 ICBMs and 
SLBMs with a little more than 150 nuclear warheads and 96 nuclear IRBMs)39 
to be able to launch a retaliatory strike after a hypothetical disarming missile 
attack by the United States employing many hundreds of nuclear warheads and 
thousands of conventional precision-guided weapons. Besides, China’s strategic 
nuclear forces would be incapable of launch-on-warning operations due to 
insufficient combat readiness of missiles, their vulnerability, and an inadequate 
effectiveness of the Chinese early warning and C3I systems. Beijing works to 
improve its forces and C3I capabilities, but its progress is not impressive. At 
the same time, its No First Use doctrine stands since many decades. In fact, 
the Chinese second-strike capability would be viable only if a large number 
of nuclear weapons are stored in the underground tunnels, ensuring that this 
additional stockpile is highly survivable and unknown to a potential adversary. 
This stockpile would not be available for immediate use but might be launched 
as a delayed retaliation.
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After abrogation of the INF Treaty, the United States is contemplating development 
and deployment of intermediate-range cruise missiles, ballistic, and (or) boost-
glide hypersonic arms in the Western Pacific. Washington’s official position is 
that, “We will not stand idle. We will take the necessary steps to ensure our 
security and that of our allies and partners. And that includes testing and 
developing systems to respond to the challenges we face …”.40
According to American experts, China’s theater-range missiles undermine the 
credibility of American extended deterrence protecting allies and partners. In 
times of crisis, the vulnerability of high-value, forward-deployed forces, including 
aircraft on the ground and ships in port, to a devastating strike could compel 
the United States to relocate military units to areas beyond the reach of Chinese 
missiles. Anti-ship versions of such missiles can hit U.S. aircraft carriers and 
ships equipped with SLCMs and Aegis missile defense systems; thus, forcing 
them to stay out of range.41 If forward bases were rendered either unusable or 
inaccessible, the United States would be compelled to fall back on Hawaii or 
Australia, thousands of kilometers from the frontlines.42
Allegedly, that is why the United States considers a number of possible military 
countermeasures previously forbidden under the INF Treaty. The primary missile 
systems considered for deployment are the ballistic Precision Strike Missile 
(PrSM) with a range of 700 km and/or a ground-launched cruise missile on the 
basis of the Tomahawk BGM -109G with a range of 1,000 km.43 Both systems 
are expected to be armed with conventional warheads. In view of the distances 
between possible basing areas and mainland China or North Korea, another 
project may involve a ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile with 
trajectory shaping vehicles (TSVs) possessing a maneuvering capacity to hone 
in precisely on a target. An alternative system may be a boost-glide IRBM,44 
presently called the Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW). Its range is 
expected to be 4,000 - 6,800 km and it could be ready for deployment in 2023 
or 2024.45
According to proponents of such systems, they have serious advantages 
compared to existing sea- or air-launched analogues. First, aircraft, ships, and 
submarines are much more expensive platforms than ground-based missile 
launchers. Second, in contrast to air and naval platforms, which require time to 
reach their firing positions, forward-deployed ground-launched missiles could 
constantly hold enemy targets at risk from where they are stationed. With short 
flight times, they would be able to attack mobile units and high-priority targets.
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Third, ground-launched theater missiles are difficult to find and to attack, for 
they can use camouflage techniques against air and space reconnaissance and 
be protected by air and missile defense systems. Fourth, ground-based missile 
batteries have logistical demands but do not require specialized facilities that 
aircraft and naval vessels need to rearm and refuel. Sixth, a modestly sized land-
based missile force could destroy parts of enemy air defenses, thereby opening 
the way for heavy bombers and fighter-bombers to attack their targets.46
From a military point of view, planning large-scale conventional war with China 
– one that would not quickly escalate to the nuclear level – is a highly dubious 
proposition even if, as always, framed in the theology of extended deterrence. 
As recognized in the U.S. 2018 Nuclear Posture Review: “China is developing 
capabilities to counter U.S. power projection operations in the region and to deny 
the United States the capability and freedom of action to protect U.S., allied, and 
partner interests. Direct military conflict between China and the United States 
would have the potential for nuclear escalation.”47
The main problem for Washington would be finding bases for the deployment 
of a sufficient number of ground-launched missiles. Ideally, they would be 
deployed in Japan (including Okinawa), South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, 
and in Australia. However, for domestic political and foreign policy reasons, this 
is unlikely to be welcomed by either of these countries. Also, Australia is too far 
away at 4,000 to 5,500 km, while Taiwan and South Korea are too close (50-130 
km) and thus militarily highly provocative as a missile basing area. Thus, the 
only assured basing location would be Guam, an American island territory in the 
Western Pacific 50 km long and 12 km wide.
If the United States plans to counter the 2,000 intermediate- and short-range 
missiles, which are ascribed to China, how many missile launchers may be 
physically deployed on this small territory to gain all the above advantages 
without presenting a densely packed lucrative target for a preemptive Chinese 
massive missile attack with conventional munitions (to say nothing of nuclear 
warheads)? A few dozen or a hundred?
A harsh reaction to this deployment in the form of missiles build-up would 
not only come from China, but from Russia as well, if it is within reach of U.S. 
missiles. Moscow would feel justified to target American missile bases as well. 
Suggested Russian deployment areas in Asia include the South Kuril Islands, 
Maritime province and Chukotka.48 The latter is the only place from where 
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Russian IRBMs can reach American strategic targets in Alaska and California. 
This may create a somewhat similar threat to the U.S. homeland as compared to 
American intermediate-range missiles deployed in Europe and Asia with regards 
to Russia.
America and China clearly have a relationship based on mutual nuclear 
deterrence. However, the nuclear balance is still heavily asymmetric in favor of 
the United States with respect to the quantitative and qualitative parameters of 
strategic nuclear forces and ballistic missile defenses, as well as C3I systems. 
Consequently, there is no parity in the strategic balance of the two states and 
also no formally recognized state of mutual assured destruction, which served 
as the basis of U.S.- Russian strategic stability and arms control talks.
The United States might be able to destroy 90 percent of China’s identified 
strategic and sub-strategic nuclear forces in a hypothetical disarming 
(counterforce) strike.49 The missile defense system that is being deployed and 
enhanced in Asia and the Pacific by the United States and its allies might be 
capable of intercepting some of the surviving Chinese nuclear missiles. Still, 
American losses after a Chinese nuclear retaliation against American cities 
(countervalue strike) could be in the millions.
Washington’s response to such a contingency is analogous to its strategy in a 
hypothetical conflict with Russia, but in contrast to that, is implicitly relying on 
U.S. nuclear superiority: “Our tailored strategy for China is designed to prevent 
Beijing from mistakenly concluding that it could secure an advantage through 
the limited use of its theater nuclear capabilities or that any use of nuclear 
weapons, however limited, is acceptable. The United States will maintain the 
capability to credibly threaten intolerable damage … such that the costs incurred 
as a result of Chinese nuclear employment, at any level of escalation, would 
vastly outweigh any benefit.” 50
The fact that China is building up its nuclear forces establishes a significant, 
though unspoken, incentive for the United States and its allies to develop a 
missile defense system in East Asia. Although the immediate justification of this 
system is to intercept North Korean missiles, Washington quite probably seeks 
to deploy a BMD system in the region to obstruct and delay China’s acquisition 
of a robust nuclear deterrent potential (not to mention strategic parity with 
Washington) with a guaranteed capability for retaliation. For obvious reasons, 
China has been even more concerned about these developments than Russia 
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has been worried about NATO’s BMD system. China’s response is to develop a 
C3I complex, BMD penetration aids, hypersonic and anti-satellite systems, and 
its own air and missile defenses.
U.S. offensive conventional weapons are also a source of major concern in China, 
especially with regard to precision-guided sea- and air-based cruise missiles 
combined with space-based reconnaissance, targeting, and communication 
systems. The prospects of hypersonic high-precision conventional boost-glide 
systems cause even larger concern for China. The Chinese are also worried 
about the U.S. experiments with the secret X-37B spacecraft that took place in 
April 2010.
The likelihood of a U.S. counterforce attack using precision-guided conventional 
weapons undercuts China’s sacramental nuclear doctrine based on an 
unconditional commitment not to use nuclear weapons first, to which it attaches 
great political importance. If Beijing makes an exception for the case of an 
attack against its nuclear forces with conventional weapons, then, in essence, 
the Chinese nuclear doctrine would not be different from that of Russia or a 
number of other states, and it would lose its unique political advantage.
2.3 RUSSIA AND CHINA
There are three principle drivers pushing Russia and China towards ever-closer 
cooperation. One is that both have economic and security interests in cooperation 
within a bilateral context, being close historic neighbors with a long and highly 
controversial history and a 4,500 km common border. A new confrontation (to 
say nothing of armed conflict) would be extremely detrimental for both sides. The 
second is that they are presently opposing U.S. leadership in the Euro-Atlantic 
and Asia-Pacific trans-regions and both are expanding their influence against 
the West in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. The third motive is the 
nature of their national political systems. They are not in any sense embarrassing 
each other, but are clearly distinct from the Western liberal democracies, which 
are perceived as an imminent threat in Moscow and Beijing. True, the same 
was the case in the 1960 -1980s, when the two neighboring nations had been 
the worst enemies in the world. But at that time they were bitter rivals for the 
leadership in the communist world while China was struggling to get out of the 
former subjugation to the USSR. At present, there is no communist world while 
both states are striving for stronger positions in their respective relations with 
the West.
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Sino-Russian strategic relations have been more controversial and ill-defined 
than between the United States and China or between Russia and the United 
States. Officially, neither of these two “strategic partners” recognizes mutual 
nuclear deterrence in their strategic relations. At the same time, they are not 
formal allies and apparently do not cooperate on nuclear weapons operations or 
development. The much recognized joint patrol of Russian and Chinese bombers 
in East Asia in July 2019 was a purely symbolic demonstration to impress the 
Americans and their allies.51
On October 3, 2019, Vladimir Putin emphasized the “unprecedented level of 
mutual trust and cooperation in an allied relationship of strategic partnership” 
and disclosed an agreement with China on helping it to build an early-warning 
system.52 Reportedly, the $60 million contract aims to develop only the software 
for a future Chinese system. As of now, there are no plans to cooperate in 
developing and deploying hardware or to share data from Russian early-warning 
satellites and land-based radars. In principle, this cooperation could enhance 
strategic stability. Given its growing nuclear arsenal, it would be dangerous if 
China would stay “deaf and blind.”
Still, this step goes beyond previous cooperation on sales of weapons and civil 
nuclear technologies. Joint early-warning systems can only exist among close 
military allies like is the case between the United States and some of its NATO 
allies (Great Britain and Denmark). If such cooperation between Russia and 
China were to expand, it would imply a tectonic shift in the regional and global 
balance of power. The worst possible consequence would be if China were to 
rely on such a system to adopt launch-on-warning as a version of its own No 
First Use commitment. The probability of inadvertent nuclear war due to false 
alarm or a technical glitch would grow exponentially were all three great nuclear 
powers to implement such strategy.
A cooperative early-warning complex just as a joint BMD system is incompatible 
with mutual nuclear deterrence, which probably will remain in a latent form 
in Russia-China strategic relations. Possibly some parts of Russia’s strategic 
nuclear forces, as well as some of its sub-strategic nuclear weapons, may be 
assigned to a deterrence mission vis-à-vis China. Interestingly enough in the 
context of Russia’s criticism of the INF Treaty during the years 2007- 2018, China 
had been mentioned together with a number of other non-INF nations possessing 
intermediate-range missiles. After the abrogation of the Treaty, Russia apparently 
intends to deploy nuclear and conventional IRBMs in Siberia and the Far East in 
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response to possible U.S. deployments in the Western Pacific. Simultaneously, 
those future missiles would be technically capable of targeting many Chinese 
military and civilian sites. This might be tacitly seen as an asset by the Russian 
military and, at the same time, as a liability for their Chinese “strategic partners.”
Most probably, a part of China’s strategic and medium-range nuclear forces also 
target Russian urban-industrial centers. Nonetheless, Russia retains a significant 
superiority over China in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, which will 
continue for the foreseeable future.
Even though mutual nuclear deterrence has taken somewhat of a backseat in 
light of closer political relations between the two powers, Russia, similarly to 
the United States, has never recognized the Chinese claim of strategic parity or 
mutual nuclear deterrence. In any case, considering the political and strategic 
aspects of their relations, Russia and China have even less of a sound basis 
for initiating mutual nuclear arms limitation talks between them than the United 
States and China.
Nonetheless, Russia should have an interest in limiting China’s strategic and 
sub-strategic nuclear and conventional systems. Whatever the political relations 
of the two neighbors in the future, Russia’s conventional inferiority in the East will 
probably grow more worrying for Moscow.
Taken together, strategic relations between the three great powers are 
asymmetrical and lack any political or strategic common ground in terms of 
strategic stability and parity. The “triangle” is unequally sided and qualitatively 
irregular (Figure 1).
CHINA
RUSSIA
U.S.
Symmetric Deterrence
Asymmetric Deterrence
Latent Deterrence
Figure 1.  
The strategic triangle:  
Russia, the United States, 
and China.
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3. PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR ARMS LIMITATIONS
However inferior in nuclear forces in comparison to the United States and 
Russia, at present, China is the only country that has the economic and technical 
capability to implement a multifold buildup of its strategic potential over the 
course of the next ten to fifteen years. Only by replacing single-warhead missiles 
with MIRVed systems China could increase the total number of warheads by two 
to three or even more times. This is what happened with the U.S. strategic forces 
during the first half of the 1970s and the Soviet Union’s strategic forces in the 
second half of the same decade. Hence, it is worthwhile to take Chinese forces 
and development programs into consideration when discussing any future 
Russian-American strategic or intermediate-range arms limitation agreements.
China officially opposes any attempt to make an issue out of China on arms control 
and will not participate in any negotiation for a trilateral nuclear disarmament 
agreement.”53 However, that position might change. In May 2019, its stance was 
a flat rejection: “The premise and basis for trilateral arms control negotiations 
do not exist at all and China will never participate in them [emphasis added 
by the author].”54 This rejection became less categorical in July 2019, after the 
abrogation of the INF Treaty: “Right now we do not see any conditions or basis 
for China to join the negotiation between the U.S. and Russia.”55
Most likely, China’s opaque stance is motivated by a desire not to reveal the actual 
size of its nuclear arsenal, which may be much larger than usually estimated. 
Besides, Beijing’s foreign and defense policy, underlying its arms control stance, 
is obviously determined by an extremely conservative, cautious, and inflexible 
bureaucratic apparatus, dominated by the party, the military, and the industry. 
This apparatus remains unchallenged at home and abroad. But in time it may 
seem worthwhile for China to rethink its stance in order to enhance its global 
status and its deterrence potential, as well as to oblige the United States to treat 
China as an equal in potential arms control talks.
Two essential preconditions would have to be met to achieve some arms control 
progress. First, China would have to see that joining the arms control process 
promises substantive strategic gains through trading-off concessions on arms 
limitation with other states. Nothing like that was ever offered to China besides 
general calls to join arms control. Second, any future agreement must not legalize 
China’s strategic inferiority vis-à-vis the two superpowers. These preconditions 
should then define what weapons systems should be subject to negotiations.
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The logic of mutual deterrence would first call for bilateral U.S.-Chinese 
diplomatic engagement. However, due to the trilateral geostrategic situation 
and the range of IRBMs (to say nothing of strategic weapons), America, and, 
perhaps clandestinely, also China would hardly agree on any arms limitations 
were Russia not part of such a deal. Anyway, a U.S.-China agreement without 
Russia is less likely than a future Russian-U.S. deal excluding China.
Finally, when discussing possible further arms control agreements on various 
classes of offensive systems, a time frame of ten to fifteen years should be taken 
into consideration. Over this period, China would be able not only to increase the 
number of its nuclear launchers but also to replace its single-warhead missiles 
with MIRVed missiles currently under development (DF-31AG, DF-41, and JL-3), 
with hypersonic arms, advanced heavy bombers, and long-range cruise missiles 
of various basing modes.
China possesses about 100 nuclear-tipped ground-launched missiles of the 
types prohibited by the late INF Treaty.56 In addition, China allegedly possesses 
up to 2,000 high-precision medium- and short-range conventional missiles, 
capable of striking U.S. aircraft carriers and sites in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, 
and Guam.57 Most likely, many of those missiles are short-range systems with less 
than 500 km range, deployed against Taiwan and other nearby zones bordering 
China. Still, these missiles are a major concern for Washington.
Half a century of U.S.-Soviet/Russian arms control experience demonstrates 
that no party would agree to legalize its inferiority and, at the same time, its 
opponent’s superiority. Therefore, negotiations should aim at setting equal 
ceilings for comparable weapons systems. Justifying its withdrawal from the 
INF Treaty, Washington is pointing at the perceived threat of 2,000 Chinese 
intermediate and short-range missiles, most of which are conventionally armed. 
Simultaneously, the United States is officially proclaiming its intention to deploy 
non-nuclear intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles in East Asia.58
This means that any hypothetical new arms control treaty should cover both 
nuclear and non-nuclear ground-launched missiles of corresponding range. 
Parity based on the current number of China’s ground-launched intermediate 
and short-range missiles would imply China’s agreeing to limit its existing 
systems in exchange for the United States’ and Russia’s right to deploy 2,000 
such weapons. If instead missiles are limited at a much lower level or even 
entirely prohibited, then, China would lose a lot in exchange for nothing. There 
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is no chance that China would accept such a deal, especially in light of the 
overwhelming advantage of the two other states in strategic weapons. Hence, the 
balance of land-based intermediate or short-range missiles (Figure 2) does not 
provide a promising starting point for arms control except under the unrealistic 
scenario of the United States and Russia quickly deploying many hundreds or 
thousands of such missiles while China refrains from responding.
Figure 2. The balance of ground-launched intermediate and short-range 
missiles.
 
Hypothetically, if China departs from its current negative stance, it would most 
likely want the overall ceiling for such missiles to include both ground and sea-
launched cruise missiles. Air-launched cruise missiles might also be included 
in China’s bargaining position.59 The United States has about 5,400 cruise 
missiles on all of its fleets,60 and Russia probably possesses a few hundreds 
of them as well (according to official reports, it has recently increased its cruise 
missile arsenal thirty-fold).61 Verifying the total number of such missiles (Figure 
3) would present an enormous challenge. They are deployed in ships’ universal 
missile launchers along with anti-aircraft, anti-missile, anti-ship/land-attack, 
and anti-submarine missiles, and on refitted strategic submarines, as well as in 
attack submarines’ vertical launchers or torpedo tubes. Unlike ground-launched 
intermediate-range missiles, the deployment of mobile sea-launched systems 
is not restricted to a particular region. That means that China would most likely 
insist on global ceilings.
Source: SPIRI Yearbook 2018: Arms, Disarmament and International Security; Remarks at a UN Secu-
rity Council Briefing on Threads to International Peace and Security. 22 August 2019, New York City.
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Figure 3. The balance of ground- and sea-launched cruise and ballistic 
intermediate- and short-range missiles.
 
The hypothetical Chinese negotiation position outlined above would be quite 
reasonable from an arms control point of view, and would put the United 
States – and to some degree, Russia – in an extremely awkward position. 
Even if negotiations would end with no result, China would still score a political 
victory simply by the fact that no one could blame the Chinese for their more 
comprehensive but quite logical position. Successful negotiations, however, 
would be a big strategic victory for China due to the global limits on both land- 
and sea-based missiles of an appropriate range of all three parties.
Chinese participation in the next START treaty, which the White House is also 
talking about, could create even greater problems for the two superpowers. For 
instance, China could ask for parity in strategic weapons at its current levels, 
which would require a seven to ten-fold reduction in the New START ceilings 
on delivery vehicles and warheads. Alternatively, it could insist on its right to 
increase its strategic weapons up to the present U.S. and Russian numbers. 
Neither of the two options would be acceptable to Washington or Moscow, even 
if a long-standing Russian demand of applying limitations on British and French 
nuclear forces were satisfied in contrast to the traditional positions of those three 
NATO allies (Figure 4).
Source: SPIRI Yearbook 2018: Arms, Disarmament and International Security; Remarks at a UN Secu-
rity Council Briefing on Threads to International Peace and Security. 22 August 2019, New York City.
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
U.S. Russia China
IFSH Research Report #002
58
Figure 4. Pentagonal strategic balance.
Nonetheless, theoretically a compromise is possible. For instance, the next 
START treaty could be a trilateral agreement with the current ceiling for 
deployed weapons. According to New START, this ceiling is at 1,550 warheads, 
but taking into account the actual available cruise missile and gravity bomb load 
on heavy bombers, it is in fact around 2,100 - 2,200 weapons. Hypothetically, 
the next agreement could set a 2,000 warheads ceiling for strategic land- and 
sea-based ballistic missiles, gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles, as 
well as land-based intermediate and short-range ballistic and cruise missiles. It 
could also include present and future boost-glide intercontinental and medium-
range systems, intercontinental cruise missiles and long-range underwater 
autonomous vehicles.
All the above systems would be limited if they have ranges in excess of 500 
km and regardless of whether their warheads are nuclear or conventional. That 
would also include the U.S. air-launched AGM-158, the JASSEM-ER, and future 
X-51 WaveRider missiles as well as the Russian Kh-555, Kh-101, and Kinzhal 
(if fitted onto aircraft that qualify as heavy bombers). Also included would be 
future U.S. and Russian land-based intermediate-range missiles. The number of 
the respective conventional systems is difficult to calculate because it changes 
all the time (partly because they are employed in local conflicts). In Figure 5, 
they are nevertheless included in both the total number of present warheads 
on strategic and intermediate range delivery vehicles and in the ceiling of a 
hypothetical future trilateral treaty.
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Figure 5. Hypothetical integrated INF-START Treaty.
 
Under such a treaty China would be allowed to increase its strategic forces 
(currently around 150 delivery vehicles and warheads), while it would have to 
reduce its intermediate-range systems that worry the United States. For their 
part, the two nuclear superpowers would have some latitude in deploying 
intermediate and short-range missiles, depending on corresponding reductions 
in their strategic systems. All three parties would thus have sufficient flexibility 
in planning the mix of their strategic and intermediate- and short-range forces, 
as well as their nuclear and conventional systems of appropriate range. To 
prevent a rapid build-up of Chinese strategic arms, a sub-ceiling of 500 - 600 on 
strategic delivery vehicles (missiles and bombers) and some other structural 
and qualitative limitations might additionally be introduced. Verifying such an 
agreement would not be more difficult than verifying the INF and START Treaties, 
provided new definitions are agreed on for hypersonic and other novel arms.
Sea-launched cruise missiles present a more serious challenge due to the 
mobility of their delivery vehicles and the universality of their launchers, but 
the initial solution may be to extend confidence-building measures to these 
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missiles, regardless of the class of warheads they carry. These measures could 
include specific notifications about certain operations of cruise missile ships 
and submarines. This might alleviate fears of a sudden cruise missile strike from 
the sea and prevent potentially disproportionate reactions.
A hypothetical treaty would benefit China through recognition of its equal status 
of a nuclear superpower, its right to rely on stable mutual nuclear deterrence 
with the other two nations, and by the economic benefits of avoiding an arms 
race. America and Russia might gain limitations, transparency, and predictability 
regarding the Chinese missile build-up in exchange for recognizing China’s 
equal nuclear status and in exchange for additional mutual strategic limitations.
From a nuclear disarmament standpoint, all that would seem like a step 
backwards. Raising warheads ceilings to 2,000 from zero under the deceased 
INF Treaty and from 1,550 under New START would require a lot of explaining 
in the UN, including convincing others of the advantage of having more realistic 
counting rules for bomber weapons. But it would still be better than a world 
without INF, and, perhaps, New START.
Expanding the nuclear arms control format is hard, but hypothetically possible. 
However, advocates of a trilateral process need to realize that it requires more 
than simply revising the current positions of third nuclear states. The two nuclear 
superpowers would pay a much higher price in that case – both in terms of force 
limitations, military strategy and politically.
4. CONCLUSION
So far, the idea of multilateral (and in particular trilateral) nuclear arms control has 
generated nothing constructive. To the contrary, due to its deceptive simplicity, 
politicians, and the public in general, easily accept it and do not object to the 
termination of the bilateral arms control process.
Meanwhile, Moscow and Washington face a number of serious issues that should 
be the subject of arms control negotiations. After the abandonment of the INF 
Treaty, the two states should at least commit to not deploy INF-prohibited missiles 
in Europe and, no less important, agree on appropriate transparency measures. 
Next, they should extend New START for a five-year period and immediately 
start discussing a follow-on agreement. Further reductions in numerical levels 
are secondary. Far more important is that the next treaty includes limits on the 
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newest nuclear and conventional strategic weapons systems and adopts realistic 
counting rules (particularly on bomber weapons) and a strict verification regime. 
Only the continuation of bilateral U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control can serve 
as the political and military basis for eventually shifting to a tri- or multilateral 
nuclear arms control format.
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1. THE NEED FOR CHINA TO DEEPEN ITS PARTICIPATION  
IN ARMS CONTROL
Despite growing international pressure for China to “join” arms control, Beijing 
generally dismisses the way the issue is framed. From its perspective, China is 
already an active contributor to arms control activities, including its participation 
in the negotiation and the signing of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), its previous efforts to promote negotiations among the Nuclear Weapons 
States to reach a joint No First Use agreement, its participation in various arms 
control talks within the U.N. and Conference on Disarmament frameworks, and 
its help with revitalizing the P5 process to discuss disarmament, among other 
things.1 That said, there are several reasons that China can and should consider 
deepening its participation in arms control, as it will serve key Chinese interests 
and help promote regional and global stability.
1.1 FACILITATE U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS
China generally recognizes that the previous bilateral measures by the United 
States and Russia to reduce their nuclear arsenals have significantly improved 
China’s security situation. If the two big powers stop the reductions process 
and eliminate existing bilateral arms control agreements, China’s security would 
inevitably be undermined. In the case of New START, China benefits from the 
transparency and verification measures in the treaty. Without them Beijing would 
likely have to apply worst-case thinking to its assessment of future U.S. and 
Russian nuclear arsenals. The longer after the treaty’s expiration, the greater 
the uncertainties about the exact U.S. and Russian capabilities. That way, China 
could be dragged into a negative action-reaction nuclear competition cycle 
among the three countries.2
Over the years, China’s impact on U.S.-Russian bilateral arms control has grown 
to the point where it cannot be ignored. In U.S. policy circles, some predict 
China’s nuclear arsenal will at least double in the next decade.3 Many American 
experts argue that the U.S. must hedge against a scenario in which China will 
sprint to parity with the United States. This leads such people to oppose further 
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reductions in U.S. forces.4 Even Russian experts and former senior military 
officials, who are usually more sympathetic to China’s nuclear policy than 
Western experts, have raised serious questions about whether China’s nuclear 
arsenal is indeed as small as most people believe.5 Such doubts likely affect 
Russian experts’ calculations about the necessary size of Russia’s future arsenal. 
Therefore, there is an increasing need for China to recognize the connection 
between the transparency and predictability of its nuclear modernization and 
the U.S. and Russian incentives to continue drawing down their nuclear forces 
and maintain their existing arms control mechanisms.
1.2 MAINTAIN STABILITY AT THE STRATEGIC LEVEL
From the Chinese perspective, the traditional concept of strategic stability is 
based on a relationship of mutual nuclear vulnerability. For China, mutual assured 
destruction by nuclear weapons provides a foundation to maintain arms race 
and crisis stability.6 However, Chinese experts worry that the United States is no 
longer committed to the traditional concept of strategic stability or interested in 
discussing strategic nuclear security issues by using this framework.7 They view 
the shift of U.S. views on this critical issue as evidence of Washington rejecting 
a mutual nuclear vulnerability relationship with Beijing. They also observe 
persistent U.S. interest in acquiring damage-limitation capabilities against 
China,8 capabilities that do not look significantly different from counterforce 
first-strike capabilities to Chinese strategists. The perceived decline in the U.S. 
political commitment to maintaining strategic stability with China is likely to 
cause serious Chinese fears about U.S. strategic intentions. This may lead to 
higher levels of investment into its nuclear modernization program to ensure the 
existence of a de facto mutual nuclear vulnerability relationship.
New challenges also arise at the technical level. Nonnuclear strategic 
technologies, such as missile defense, conventional precision-strike weapons, 
counter space weapons, remote sensing technologies, and cyber weapons, 
among others, present potential threats to nuclear weapons systems. Those 
challenges are usually exacerbated by a tendency to overestimate the impact of 
new technologies. Chinese and Russian nuclear modernization efforts to offset 
the impact of U.S. nonnuclear technologies are often seen by the United States 
as excessive and driven by revisionist goals to adopt more aggressive nuclear 
postures. And the United States then feels obligated to respond. Divergent 
understandings about the impact of new technologies make it much more 
challenging to maintain strategic stability.
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To avoid a nuclear arms race and maintain strategic stability is clearly in China’s 
interest. But it would become harder to achieve that interest if China waits longer 
to engage in arms control and cooperative security measures that help contain 
the arms competition before it further intensifies. Whether the United States is 
willing to accept a mutual vulnerability relationship with China may be a function 
of whether it perceives China as a status quo power as opposed to a revisionist 
power that embraces aggressive intentions. From the U.S. perspective, a 
revisionist power that seeks to change the status quo may be less deterrable by 
mutual vulnerability as it has an inherent incentive to provoke; and thus the United 
States may have to develop the capacity to stop any attacks that aim at forcefully 
changing the existing security landscape. For this reason, it has not been very 
productive for China to complain about the lack of explicit acknowledgement of 
and commitment to mutual vulnerability by the U.S. side. Rather, there may be 
more effective ways for China to influence U.S. thinking on mutual vulnerability 
by taking measures that can help assure the United States of China’s strategic 
intentions.
In the nuclear area, China’s benign strategic intention can be shown by 
demonstrating that it has no plan to increase its nuclear forces to a level 
inconsistent with a minimum deterrent doctrine, or to raise the status of its 
nuclear weapons in national security strategy, or to broaden the scenarios of 
potential employment of its nuclear weapons. Chinese participation in arms 
control measures that can provide transparency and put some tangible limit 
on some of these activities would be a convincing demonstration of Chinese 
intention.
Arms control is needed to regulate the development and/or deployment of 
new technologies or at least help narrow the perception gap between states on 
the nature or degree of the threat posed by new technologies against nuclear 
weapons systems. This can help manage the intensity of arms competition by 
containing the severity and prevalence of worst-case scenario thinking that 
drives nuclear modernization investments.
Furthermore, the impact of the introduction of new technologies on conflict 
escalation and crisis management is far from being fully understood by decision-
makers in the main possessor states of such technologies. The scholarly 
community has started to examine the potential impact, including conducting 
research on, for example, how conventional hypersonic weapons may create 
new ambiguities that can lead to inadvertent escalation,9 how the entanglement 
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of nonnuclear technologies and nuclear weapons systems may cause 
misunderstandings and misjudgment in military crises,10 how the incorporation 
of artificial intelligence (AI) into strategic warning may undermine the system’s 
reliability and affect strategic stability,11 and how the use of cyber technologies 
against each other’s nuclear command and control system can generate new 
pathways to misperceptions and overreactions.12 A general consensus is 
emerging within the Western scholarly community that such risks are serious 
and need to be addressed systematically and sooner rather than later. In the 
meantime, the Chinese counterparts are following such research but do not 
appear to have arrived at the same level of concern and urgency as their Western 
colleagues.
At the government level, there is clearly lack of awareness and appreciation of 
such risks. Defense procurement decisions and military doctrines are being 
made without considering these potential risks. It is almost inevitable that when 
great power competition grows, states focus more of their attention on how to 
improve their military effectiveness. Thinking through how some of the new 
capabilities may exacerbate escalation dynamics becomes a secondary priority. 
The introduction of dual-capable ballistic missile systems that can deliver 
either nuclear or conventional warheads is one example of this worrisome 
trend. Such missile systems have greater operational flexibility and efficiency 
on the battlefield but they also present a challenge for an enemy to accurately 
understand the nature of the threat it faces during a crisis. If a confused enemy 
overreacts, one’s own security would be severely undermined as a result of 
inadvertent escalation. Awareness of such risks does not come automatically, 
especially not for countries like China, which does not have first-hand experience 
of serious nuclear crises and military incidents involving nuclear weapons. As 
a result, arms control talks would be quite necessary to raise risk awareness 
among experts, military strategists, and political decision-makers. Only after 
states share a common understanding of the risks, would it be possible for them 
to have serious discussions about how the development and/or deployment of 
new technologies can be regulated to address these risks. With great power 
competition on the rise, the need to prevent arms competitions from introducing 
new escalation risks that threaten everyone and undermine strategic stability 
becomes ever more pressing.
Arms control is also an imperative for big powers to assure each other about 
their strategic intentions at a time when their overall relations become more 
competitive and distrust grows. In the case of China, the intensifying competition 
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with the United States saw the rise of the view in Beijing’s security policy circles 
that Washington has adopted a strategic goal of undermining and destabilizing 
China and is willing to use all means at its disposal to preserve U.S. “hegemonic 
power” and “global dominance.”13 At the same time, U.S. suspicion of China’s 
strategic intentions has deepened and there is growing concern about an 
expansionist and revisionist China seeking to replace the United States and 
dictate international rulemaking in the future. Against this background, it is even 
more important that America and China make every effort to assure each other 
about their strategic nuclear security objectives. A reaffirmation of the shared 
goal of maintaining strategic stability and joint arms control efforts to regulate 
their strategic forces for the achievement of this common objective can help build 
confidence that at the fundamental level they have no intention to threaten the 
very survival of each other or to challenge their most critical security interests. All 
that could happen, despite the continuous existence of serious disagreements 
and disputes over other issues.
1.3 MANAGE CONVENTIONAL COMPETITION
The conventional military competition among the great powers is even more 
troublesome than their nuclear competition. Unlike at the nuclear level, there 
is no shared vision of respecting mutual vulnerability, maintaining arms race 
stability, and preventing military conflict at the conventional level. In some cases, 
the great powers embrace competing visions about the desired end states of 
their conventional military balance. China believes the only way to secure its 
territorial integrity in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and over the Taiwan 
Strait is to acquire conventional military superiority over its regional rivals and 
over the United States in parts of the West Pacific, so that when it becomes 
necessary for China to use physical means to defend its perceived territorial 
integrity, its regional rivals could do nothing and the United States would be 
deterred from even trying to intervene. China sees it as a legitimate strategy to 
advance a defensive objective, but it requires a regional conventional military 
balance that is in China’s favor and would by no means be acceptable to China’s 
rivals and the United States. For those actors, their security (and survival, in 
some cases) relies on a regional conventional military balance that never 
completely favors China. Such incompatible visions almost guarantee that future 
conventional competition will be exceptionally intense.
So far, China does not seem to be bothered by the lack of arms control 
institutions to mitigate or regulate the ongoing conventional military competition 
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in the Asia Pacific region. As China’s GDP growth rate has been much higher 
than all its regional rivals, including the United States over the past decades, 
Chinese experts have shown a high level of confidence about China’s capability 
to outcompete its rivals in the conventional military domain. Time appears to be 
on China’s side and it only needs to be patient. However, this optimism does 
not take into account a few issues that would have a negative impact on China’s 
security.
China’s conventional military superiority would work against its efforts to maintain 
a stable nuclear relationship with the United States, for at least two reasons. First, 
from the Chinese perspective, the foundation of a stable nuclear relationship 
with the United States is for Washington to acknowledge and accept a de facto 
mutual nuclear vulnerability relationship with Beijing. However, one important 
reason that the United States has refused to do so is opposition from its allies 
such as Japan, who worry that a stable U.S.-China relationship at the nuclear 
level would embolden Chinese military aggression at the conventional level. For 
countries like Japan, it is important that the U.S.-China nuclear relationship is 
not 100 percent stable so that China would have to worry about the risk of a 
conventional conflict escalating to the nuclear level and thus be deterred from 
initiating conventional aggression against its neighbors. The more successfully 
China establishes regional conventional military superiority, the more worried 
Japan and other U.S. allies will become, and therefore the more strongly they 
might lobby against Washington accepting mutual vulnerability or maintaining 
strategic stability with Beijing. This would undermine China’s core nuclear policy 
objective.
Second, the same logic impels U.S. regional allies to oppose Washington 
embracing a No First Use (NFU) policy. The Obama administration decided not to 
adopt NFU largely because U.S. allies argued that China’s growing conventional 
capabilities and increasing willingness to flex its conventional military muscle 
made a conventional-only U.S. military response appear too weak and too late 
to stop a massive Chinese conventional attack. Further increasing China’s 
conventional superiority would make the United States even less likely to adopt 
a policy of NFU. This would be very problematic for China who has long sought a 
mutual NFU agreement with the United States and other nuclear weapons states. 
Beijing sees such an agreement as the most important nuclear risk reduction 
and arms control measure. However, it appears China has not recognized this 
internal mismatch between its nuclear and conventional policy goals.
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Furthermore, China’s conventional military superiority could create greater 
interest among concerned U.S. allies about developing indigenous military 
nuclear capabilities. In some quarters of Japan’s security policy circles, a 
connection has long been made between the Chinese conventional military 
threat and Japan’s need for its own nuclear weapons.14 South Korea has grown 
wary of China’s conventional capabilities and wants to hedge against future 
uncertainties, especially after experiencing harsh punishment from Beijing 
because of the deployment of a THAAD missile defense system.15 Australia’s 
growing concern about China’s conventional military capability has led to voices 
calling for an independent nuclear deterrent, including from a former deputy 
secretary of defense.16 Against the background of declining U.S. security 
commitments to its allies, such proliferation risks appear to increase. As a result, 
China’s security interests could be significantly undermined.
All the above are important reasons for China to participate in the cooperative 
management of conventional military competition in the Asia Pacific region. Direct 
China-U.S. discussions on concepts to promote mutually acceptable regional 
conventional arms control measures would be useful for this purpose. But that is 
not the only reason for great power cooperation on the conventional balance. In a 
post-INF world, the United States has incentives to deploy land-based INF-range 
conventional missiles in the Asia Pacific region to counterbalance the growing 
Chinese conventional capabilities. However, such missiles may end up becoming 
a greater threat to North Korea, whose security would be more seriously affected 
by U.S. conventional precision strike weapons than that of China. Consequently, 
North Korea would likely choose to further enhance its nuclear and strategic 
conventional strike capabilities.17 Such North Korean reactions would not only 
directly worsen the security environment in Northeast Asia, but have additional 
ripple effects on China. As the military threat from North Korea grows, the United 
States, South Korea, and Japan would have stronger incentives to deploy missile 
defense and even preemptive deep-strike capabilities against the DPRK. China 
and Russia would likely view such capabilities as a threat to their own nuclear 
deterrent. In other words, an intensified U.S.-China conventional competition 
in the region could worsen the security dynamics vis-à-vis third parties (North 
Korea, in this case), which would then destabilize the great powers’ nuclear and 
overall security relations. Due to the stakes involved, it is time for China and the 
other great powers to include in arms control talks the issue of managing their 
growing conventional competitions.
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1.4 ECONOMIC NECESSITY AND INTERNATIONAL IMAGE
New economic realities present additional reasons for China and other great 
powers to work together on arms control. For the foreseeable future, economic 
prospects do not look particularly bright for America, Russia, or China. After 
decades of fast economic growth, deep structural problems with China’s 
economic and financial systems have started to emerge and deteriorate. The 
looming stagnation, deep government debts, a lurking housing bubble, China’s 
fast-aging society, unprecedented trade conflicts, and growing decoupling 
between Chinese and Western economies, among other critical issues, are 
forcing people to accept that the era of China’s rapid economic growth is behind 
us. There are growing concerns among some economists that an economic 
crisis may be around the corner.18 In contrast, over the previous years of material 
abundance, high levels of confidence within the Chinese expert community 
and the general public about China’s long-term capability to out-invest and 
outcompete its main rivals in defense capabilities were widespread. It is uncertain 
how quickly the new economic realities today will change people’s perceptions, 
but rational decision-makers need to be cool-headed and far-sighted about the 
economic implications for China’s defense policy. They need to think about and 
prepare for a future in which they would have much fewer resources to invest in 
military modernizations than before.
As an example, in a post-INF world, can the United States, Russia, and China 
really afford a massive reciprocal buildup of INF-range missiles? If decision-
makers take prudent consideration of the economic realities they are likely to 
face in the future, a joint arms control effort to prevent a costly arms race that 
would not improve anyone’s security should look more appealing.
Increased Chinese participation in arms control could also generate important 
political benefits. Chinese experts see its strategic competition with the United 
States as a comprehensive and long-term process. One important element is 
competition for influence in international rule setting and for global leadership 
in shaping and maintaining key international institutions. Arms control is an 
important part of international institutions and China has already shown interest 
in improving its image as a responsible power by showcasing its support for 
the international arms control agenda. Especially at a time when Washington 
is withdrawing its participation in existing arms control regimes and voluntarily 
vacating its long-standing leadership role in this arena, China may step in, 
hoping to establish its image as a more responsible future leader in global 
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affairs and a stronger supporter of multilateralism. Recent examples are China’s 
efforts to revitalize the P5 process on nuclear disarmament as well as the public 
announcement to initiate domestic legal procedure for China’s accession to the 
Arms Trade Treaty.19 Looking into the future, as more members of the international 
community explicitly call for China’s participation in arms control, a positive 
response from Beijing could help China win international support and favorable 
reputation. This would augment Beijing’s efforts to build up international soft 
power. As China’s military power to defend its global economic interests expand, 
China’s cooperation in arms control could reduce incentives for others to build 
up military power to balance China. For the international community, competition 
between the great powers over international leadership on arms control would 
be much more favorable and welcome than unconstrained competition over 
military power.
2. POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO CONDUCT TRILATERAL ARMS CONTROL
Admittedly, although there are strong arguments for China to deepen its 
participation in arms control, trilateral arms control with the United States and 
Russia is not necessarily the only way to do so. Nonetheless, trilateral arms 
control can provide unique benefits, which this paper seeks to identify and 
analyze.
From China’s perspective, U.S.-Chinese bilateral arms control may inadvertently 
reinforce the impression of a formal rivalry relationship resembling that of 
the U.S.-USSR relationship during the Cold War. Beijing wants to avoid that 
impression. A trilateral mechanism can help. Moreover, China may have greater 
confidence about its capability to protect its key interests in a trilateral process 
than in bilateral U.S.-China negotiations. Russia could help support China’s 
positions on issues of common concern such as missile defense and space-
based weapons.
Politically, trilateral arms control diplomacy can help raise China’s status as a 
major global military power on par with the two former superpowers, something 
that may be appealing to Chinese leaders who have invested in military 
modernization to help raise China’s international status and to rally domestic 
support. The achievements of military modernization have been selling points to 
prove the advantages of the Chinese model and the competence of its political 
leadership. Trilateral arms control could also promote China’s image as a 
supporter of multilateralism in international affairs.
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2.1 PRECONDITIONS TO A TRILATERAL PROCESS
The greatest obstacle for China to deepen participation in arms control is the 
perception that the other parties, especially the United States, may seek to use 
arms control to help win great power competition against China. Within China’s 
security policy circles, the long-standing majority view has always been that 
arms control is simply “a tool to maintain [U.S.] hegemony.”20 Such a view gets 
reinforced by senior U.S. officials emphasizing the intent to use nonproliferation 
and arms control policies to help achieve America’s great power competition 
strategy.21
Persuading Chinese leaders to join trilateral arms control will require the United 
States to set a mutually acceptable objective. Using arms control to advance 
one’s military advantage vis-à-vis China is a nonstarter for Beijing, especially as 
Washington cannot force China into any arms control deal. Cooperative arms 
control is only achievable if all parties accept the goal of managing rather than 
winning competition.
From this perspective, any arms control approach to be offered to China must 
be mutually beneficial and involve give and take from all parties. An approach 
that imposes constraints on China alone, will never work. The following are some 
arms control proposals that China could view as generally balanced and worthy 
of consideration. None of the proposed options would be easy to negotiate. The 
level of technical complexity would dramatically increase as countries move 
from a general political willingness to explore common interests to substantive 
negotiations on an implementable agreement. The purpose of these options, 
however, is to identify some general approaches through which trilateral arms 
control talks could be seriously considered. Thus, these options are meant to 
be balanced, fair, and equitable, seeking to take into consideration the most 
important security needs of all parties involved. The aim is to frame an approach 
that none of the three could immediately reject without exposing itself to the rest 
of the world as mal-intentioned.
2.2 TRILATERAL ARMS CONTROL: FOUR SPECIFIC PROPOSALS
The least ambitious proposal would be to prevent a reciprocal INF-type missile 
buildup in the Asia Pacific region. Instead of the U.S. deployment of INF-type 
missiles in the Asia Pacific, most likely followed by a possible Russian deployment 
and a response by China that could include a considerable increase in its INF-
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type missile arsenal, all three could choose to maintain the status quo of their 
existing INF-type missile capabilities in the region. This would include nuclear 
and conventionally capable INF-type missiles. Such an arrangement would not 
only save them from a costly new INF-type missile competition that would not 
make any of them safer; it could also contribute to avoiding the likely political 
troubles associated with Washington convincing its regional allies to deploy 
such missiles on their territories and Beijing’s retaliatory responses.
Additionally, the three countries could choose to negotiate whether hypersonic 
boost-glide weapons, which may not be covered by the INF definition, should 
be included in a status-quo freeze. They could also think about whether such 
an arrangement should be expanded to the global level, beyond the Asia 
Pacific region.
A second option would be to set an equal ceiling for all INF-range (500-5,500km) 
ground- and air-launched missiles, including nuclear and conventionally capable 
ones. This would address a key U.S., and to a lesser extent Russian, concern 
about China’s large INF missile stockpile. Including air-launched INF-range 
missiles, in which the United States currently possesses a clear advantage and 
where Russia has also some advantage over China, would also be attractive to 
Beijing. Of China’s total number of INF-range ground- and air-launched ballistic 
and cruise missiles, 1,250-2,650 are ground-launched missiles.22 In addition to 
that, China possesses a small number of air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) 
and an even smaller number of air-launched ballistic missiles that are under 
development and may soon be introduced. The United States has no ground-
launched missiles within this range limit but is procuring more air-launched cruise 
missiles such as the JASSM-ER and the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM). 
Together with the existing U.S. Air Launched Cruise Missiles and Conventional 
Air Launched Cruise Missiles, the total number of U.S. INF-range ground- and 
air-launched missiles will reach or exceed 2,000 in the near-term future.23 Russia 
reportedly has deployed a small number of INF-range 9M729 ground-launched 
cruise missiles (GLCMs) and has hundreds of ALCMs, in addition to a small 
number of newly introduced Kh-47M2 Kinzhal missiles that may qualify as air-
launched ballistic missiles.24 Therefore, an equal ceiling would give Russia some 
benefit by allowing it more room to expand such missile stockpiles, but given 
Russia’s much smaller defense budget and overall GDP, the chances for Russia 
to grow its INF-range ground- and air-launched missile arsenals significantly are 
not very high.
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This proposal does not include sea-launched INF-range missiles, for a number 
of reasons. One is that the existing capability gaps between the three countries 
in this realm are too great to make any equal ceiling agreement feasible. 
According to assessments by Russian experts, the United States can deploy a 
maximum of more than 6,000 INF-range Tomahawk cruise missiles on various 
naval platforms.25 The Russian and Chinese numbers are in the hundreds or 
fewer. The second reason has to do with the traditional bureaucratic resistance 
against transparency and other arms control measures by navies including the 
U.S. Navy. Additionally, the United States and Russia view their air- and sea-
launched INF-range missiles as a key component of their global military power 
projection capability. If they are going to limit their air-launched INF-range missiles 
in exchange for China limiting its ground-launched missiles, which only affect 
certain parts of the Asia Pacific, they may have a strong incentive to keep their 
sea-launched INF-range missiles out of such a trade to preserve their existing 
advantages in global power projection.
In this proposal, an equal ceiling for all three countries would leave them with 
considerable freedom and flexibility to decide how each country would like to 
mix their ground-launched and air-launched missile arsenals. Where to set an 
equal ceiling for all three countries would be a product of negotiations. The 
ceiling could be set as low as the same level of the current size of Chinese and 
U.S. stockpiles of ground- and air-launched INF-range missiles, in which case it 
would constitute a freeze arrangement. It could also be set higher than current 
stockpiles, in which case it would become a capping agreement. In either case, 
such a proposal could serve as the starting point for the three countries to think 
about how to manage their competition over INF-range missile capabilities.
A third option would combine the INF and New START frameworks. The most 
obvious way to achieve this is to set an equal ceiling for the total number of 
deployed ground-launched INF- and intercontinental-range ballistic missile 
(ICBM) launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, and heavy 
bombers. In doing so, the three countries could adopt the same method as 
under New START to impose an equal upper limit on the total number of ICBM 
launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. The only difference is that 
the scope of controlled weapons would be broadened by including INF-range 
ground-launched ballistic missile launchers as well. In doing so, the three 
countries can put themselves under the same equal ceiling with relative ease, 
without making substantial changes to their current capabilities.
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According to their most recent data submission, the United States and Russia 
currently have 668 and 513 deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and 
heavy bombers, respectively; and both of them have no INF-range land-based 
ballistic missile launchers. China operates about 570 land-based INF- and 
intercontinental-range ballistic missile launchers,26 48 SLBM launchers with 24 
additional ones to be deployed on two new SSBNs soon, as well as about 20 
H-6 bombers,27 the total number of which is 662 and is on the same scale as 
that of the United States and Russia. Such an equal ceiling for all three countries 
would not immediately reduce any of their existing capabilities but could include 
them all in one arms control framework on an equal footing. It would address 
the U.S. and Russian concerns about both China’s INF-type missiles and its 
strategic nuclear forces. In doing so, it would meet the two principle demands 
by the Trump administration for China to join INF and New START in some form. 
It would also avoid creating the impression that China is forced into an unequal 
arms control agreement as a junior partner of two former superpowers.
There are many opportunities for the three countries to finetune the specific 
scope of weapons systems they might want to include under such an equal 
ceiling. For instance, they could think about whether to also add INF-range 
GLCMs and/or hypersonic boost-glide and/or intercontinental-range cruise 
missiles to the overall limit. The numbers of such weapons systems that are 
already deployed and may be deployed in the future will not be very large and 
should be relatively easy to be incorporated into such an agreement. This overall 
limit could first serve as a trilateral capping agreement. Should the strategic 
environment and the political will allow for it, it could gradually evolve into a 
freeze and later into a joint reduction agreement.
A fourth and more appealing option to China (and Russia) is to include kinetic 
missile defense interceptors into an overall ceiling. To some extent, this would 
help address Russian and Chinese concerns about the impact of U.S. missile 
defense on their strategic nuclear deterrents. One way to do so is for the three 
countries to negotiate an exchange ratio between one offensive missile and the 
number of kinetic interceptors that could intercept it with a certain high level of 
confidence, so that a country has the freedom to deploy interceptors as long as 
it cuts a corresponding number of offensive missiles to keep its overall number 
of weapons within the central limit.
For instance, the United States appears to operate under the assumption that 
four Ground-Based Interceptors (GBIs) would have to be fired against each 
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incoming ICBM in order to secure a certain probability of success.28 If a general 
ratio of 1:4 is agreed for all INF- and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles and 
interceptors that are capable of countering such missiles, then in exchange for 
every four additional interceptors the United States deploys, it would need to cut 
one offensive missile from its existing stockpile. The United States does not plan 
to deploy a very large number of GBIs, but it may deploy hundreds of SM-3 and 
THAAD interceptors in the future, in which case the exchange mechanism may 
give Russia and China useful leverage to pressure the United States on its missile 
defense programs but still leave considerable room for Washington to make 
flexible decisions on the tradeoff between deploying missiles and interceptors.
All the above four proposals seek to provide politically acceptable options for the 
three countries to start talking about arms control. Due to their existing high level 
of distrust and China’s particular lack of experience in implementing arms control 
verification, all the proposed ceilings and central limits are meant to come in the 
form of political commitments at the early stage of a trilateral process. Verification 
measures are not included in these initial proposals and could be elaborated 
at later stages of a trilateral process. Thus, nuclear and conventionally armed 
missiles are not particularly distinguished in the above proposals. That said, 
nothing prevents the United States and Russia from continuing their existing 
mutually beneficial bilateral transparency and verification measures under New 
START, even after a trilateral agreement is reached.
2.3 CAPACITY BUILDING ON VERIFICATION, DOCTRINES,  
AND A RULES-BASED ORDER
As mentioned above, even though the three countries can start discussions 
on arms control, that process may eventually come to a stage when serious 
verification measures need to be considered. China has less experience with 
designing and implementing verification measures than the other two countries. 
This has caused China to be more skeptical about the overall utility of arms 
control as a cooperative security arrangement.
An argument often heard within the Chinese security community is as follows: 
Even if China enters an arms control agreement with stronger parties such as 
the United States and Russia, such an agreement would inevitably favor the 
stronger parties because they have better technological capabilities to continue 
developing prohibited technologies in secret whereas China would end up being 
the only one constrained by the agreement.29 Among other things, this popular 
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view reflects a serious level of distrust about the effectiveness of verification 
measures to ensure compliance with arms control obligations or timely detection 
of violations. Many Chinese security experts do not seem to have given thought 
to the historical fact that although the level of U.S.-USSR strategic distrust during 
the Cold War was even higher than in current U.S.-China relations, the United 
States and the Soviet Union were able to negotiate and implement a series of 
significant arms control agreements and were able to maintain a sufficiently high 
level of confidence and trust through verification.
If measures could be taken to help Chinese security experts appreciate the 
generally successful history of bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control endeavors 
and to understand how verification measures can be designed to overcome the 
distrust gap at the political level, an important obstacle against China’s more 
active participation in arms control would be removed. These measures could 
start with inviting Chinese observers to U.S.-Russian arms control inspection 
activities. To increase Chinese interest to participate, no reciprocal demand 
should be made on China to also provide transparency and to open up its own 
facilities to foreign visitors, as the goal of such exercises should be to help 
build capacity, which, over the long run, could prove beneficial to all parties. 
The United States and Russia could start inviting Chinese observers to their 
New START on-site inspections and Open Skies flights, though the latter would 
require consent from other treaty members as well.
It would also make sense for the United States and Russia to share with 
their Chinese colleagues their experiences with providing transparency and 
implementing confidence-building measures (CBMs) in the nuclear field. This 
could include their experiences with setting up bilateral CBMs such as the 
missile- and space-launch notification agreements that include both pre- and 
post-launch notifications, as well as the exchange of telemetry generated during 
missile flight tests that seeks to provide openness and transparency. China’s 
long-standing opposition to transparency and CBMs is deeply rooted in its 
history and culture of military secrecy,30 especially in the area of strategic arms. 
One important benefit of a trilateral arms control process should be for the more 
experienced parties – the United States and Russia – to share their positive 
lessons learned from participation in existing bilateral CBMs to the newcomer 
and to help China overcome its habitual concerns.
Capacity-building measures need to include both vertical and horizontal efforts: 
vertical measures help Chinese experts develop deeper understandings and/or 
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new perspectives; and horizontal measures help build such capacity across a 
larger number of Chinese experts within the security community. In the case of 
arms control verification, China is generally supportive of international scientific 
cooperation to develop arms control verification technologies, but China’s level 
of participation in international arms control verification initiatives and programs 
is modest. One of the reasons seems to be that the Chinese community of arms 
control experts with sufficient technical background is too small to support a wide 
and deep Chinese participation in various international initiatives like the IPNDV. 
The workforce is stretched thin and has a hard time keeping up. Therefore, it 
is important to help cultivate a larger number of Chinese experts, including the 
next generation. This requires extensive engagement among the U.S., Russian, 
and Chinese security policy and arms control communities in a sustainable 
manner over a long period. More Chinese experts supportive of the positive 
role of verification measures could mean an increased interest in exploring 
the possibility that future Chinese nuclear weapons and delivery systems are 
designed and manufactured in ways to facilitate transparency measures and 
even accommodate inspections without divulging sensitive information. Such 
deliberation and exploration at the technical and operational levels could take 
place already now to prepare for future options for the political decision-makers 
when they are ready for more arms control cooperation.
Vertical capacity building could help address mismatched understandings 
about each other’s nuclear policies and thus remove obstacles for arms control 
cooperation. For instance, the majority view of the Chinese security community 
is that the United States, under the Trump administration, reemphasizes low-
yield tactical nuclear weapons in order to more easily threaten other countries 
with nuclear weapons (in other words, to deliberately lower the threshold for 
nuclear use) and to build up U.S. nuclear warfighting capabilities.31 When the 
other side is driven by a nuclear warfighting doctrine, Chinese experts do not 
see the value of arms control. For them, the right thing for China to do in this 
case is to enhance further its own nuclear capabilities to counterbalance the 
U.S. developments. However, the United States believes its nuclear policy 
readjustment is due to a growing interest in recent years in the Russian military 
doctrine to use tactical nuclear weapons in conventional conflicts, which, in turn, 
Washington wants to deter with its low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
Trilateral arms control discussions should therefore focus on talking through 
the differences in the three parties’ perceived nuclear policies of each other. 
Especially for countries where substantive internal policy debates rarely take 
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place, the questions and challenges posed among the three behind closed 
doors can be useful to stimulate new perspectives and provide opportunities 
for reflecting on potential inconsistencies and ambiguities in one’s own doctrine 
and policy. On recent occasions when Chinese experts had the opportunity 
to watch U.S. and Russian experts having in-depth debates over the alleged 
Russian “escalate to deescalate” strategy, they saw that there is more substance 
and nuance to this debate than it originally appears. More importantly, although 
these Chinese experts did not necessarily share the U.S. view that Russia has a 
de facto “escalate to deescalate” nuclear strategy, they did seem to appreciate 
the fact that these are genuine concerns widely shared within the U.S. policy 
community. Such appreciation of the perspectives of “the other”, by itself, could 
help reduce the suspicion that Washington simply uses the Russian policy as an 
excuse to build up U.S. nuclear warfighting capabilities. Substantive discussions 
about each other’s nuclear doctrines and thinking in a trilateral setting can offer 
some unique benefit in containing worst-case thinking and developing empathy, 
both of which are necessary conditions for serious arms control talks.
China has long embraced the view that the only sensible way to conduct arms 
control is for all main nuclear weapons states to accept relationships of mutual 
vulnerability first and to adopt a minimal nuclear deterrent strategy with a doctrine 
of solely using nuclear weapons to deter nuclear attacks. To reject such proposals 
is seen as contradictory to arms control. However, China does not yet recognize 
the connection between some of its own military strategies and the reluctance 
of some other nuclear powers – especially the United States – to accept mutual 
nuclear vulnerability and the sole purpose doctrine. As mentioned above, 
America’s and its allies’ concern about China’s efforts to achieve conventional 
superiority in its neighborhood coupled with the perceived growth of China’s 
military assertiveness at the conventional level is a major barrier for Washington 
to embrace those nuclear policies that China desires. Such issues need to be 
thoroughly examined in future talks. Even if it is impossible for all three parties to 
reach common ground on these issues, achieving awareness and appreciation 
of each other’s’ perspectives as a result thereof, would be worth the effort.
Another element of capacity building could be educating the nuclear policy 
communities in all three countries to appreciate the importance of a rules-
based nuclear order. Genuine interest in arms control is only possible if there is 
confidence that everyone is interested in building and maintaining a rules-based 
nuclear order that can better protect the respective national security interests as 
compared to a messy arms competition. At least in China, such confidence does 
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not yet exist. The dominant view within the Chinese security community is that 
all the other big powers are driven by a “might makes right” doctrine and that 
the nature of international relations is power politics. In a perceived world system 
where the law of the jungle applies, nationalistic analysts insist that a bigger 
nuclear arsenal will win China greater international respect.32
The most effective way to debunk such problematic perspectives is to develop 
balanced and nuanced understandings about the history of nuclear diplomacy, 
about each other’s nuclear development programs, their underlying assumptions, 
and each other’s nuclear policy deliberations as well as the various factors that 
contribute to the internal debates and calculations. From the very beginning, 
a trilateral arms control discussion should devote sustained efforts to sponsor 
deep, substantive, and extensive dialogues to talk through these nuanced 
issues. The goal should not be to generate quick changes to official policy or 
attitude. Rather, it would be to foster the development of balanced and nuanced 
perspectives. Over time, rational voices may gain momentum over simplistic and 
cynical perspectives, and support for a collective effort to build and maintain a 
rules-based global nuclear order may prevail.
2.4 STRATEGIC STABILITY AND RISK REDUCTION
In the near term, there are areas where trilateral efforts that focus on maintaining 
strategic stability and reducing the risk of nuclear use could start sooner than 
the capacity building measures outlined before. From the Chinese perspective, 
to maintain arms race stability means to consolidate de facto mutual nuclear 
vulnerability relations and to prevent other countries from acquiring disarming 
first strike capabilities against itself. To maintain crisis stability means to avoid 
nuclear conflict through crisis prevention and management. Chinese officials 
and experts are highly supportive of these goals as they help secure China’s 
key interests.33 That said, to effectively maintain strategic stability would require 
substantial efforts by China and the other two parties to reflect on their own 
thinking and practices and to jointly resolve key obstacles.
One obstacle of maintaining crisis stability has to do with countries’ different 
perceptions of conflict escalation dynamics. For example, China appears 
generally sanguine about the prospect that conventional conflicts can be 
effectively controlled and will not easily escalate to the nuclear level. At the same 
time, China is pessimistic about the prospect of controlling nuclear escalation, 
including a widely shared belief that once the nuclear threshold is crossed with 
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even one nuclear weapon employed, there would be no way to control further 
escalation, and even a very limited nuclear conflict would quickly and inevitably 
develop into all-out nuclear war.34 The majority view in the United States seems 
to be exactly the opposite. Many American experts worry about the risk of 
inadvertent escalation of conventional conflicts to the nuclear level but seem 
to believe that even after the nuclear threshold has been crossed there would 
still be opportunities to manage a limited nuclear conflict without causing all-out 
nuclear war. In previous discussions, such divergent beliefs in pre- and post-
nuclear use escalation risks and dynamics sometimes caused the different 
parties to talk past each other.
One way to improve the effectiveness of these discussions would be to first 
raise mutual awareness of the differences in views and assumptions about 
crisis stability risks. It would be helpful to seek to understand the sources of 
divergent perspectives. Such understanding might help stimulate self-reflection 
on one’s own thinking and beliefs. One possible reason, for instance, that 
the United States is less confident about countries’ capabilities to effectively 
prevent conventional conflicts from escalating to the nuclear level is its firsthand 
experiences of serious military crises during the Cold War that almost led to 
inadvertent nuclear use. But Chinese leaders have much less experience in that 
regard and therefore largely dismiss how incidents, ambiguous signaling and 
misjudgment, or the fog of war could undermine the top leaders’ capacity to 
understand and control military developments on the battlefield. Furthermore, 
China has rarely fought on foreign soil over the last three decades and Chinese 
leaders have not gone through the experience of accepting significant losses 
in conventional wars, which raises the question of whether China may be less 
inclined to escalate if it suffers unprecedented losses in a future conventional 
conflict.35 The awareness of such issues could encourage China to adopt a more 
open attitude towards cooperative measures with other parties on conventional 
escalation management. Similarly, a deeper understanding by the United States 
about the Chinese reasoning of why a limited nuclear conflict could hardly be 
controlled might encourage Washington to reexamine the wisdom of relying 
too much on the hope of effectively managing a nuclear conflict after it breaks 
out as opposed to putting more emphasis on preventing any nuclear use in the 
first place.
Another obstacle comes from non-nuclear strategic technologies, which pose 
the greatest threat to arms race stability among the three countries. Their very 
significant and genuine disagreements about the level of impact from technologies 
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such as missile defense on the credibility of their respective nuclear deterrent 
are the primary drivers of Russian and Chinese current nuclear modernization 
efforts. There needs to be a joint effort to narrow such disagreements through 
substantive exchanges at the expert level, especially on key disputes that involve 
all three countries, such as the one over the extent to which the U.S. THAAD 
missile defense system’s radar in South Korea may affect Russian and Chinese 
strategic nuclear forces. Here, a joint trilateral technical effort at the unclassified 
level could be useful.
Non-nuclear strategic technologies also pose challenges to crisis stability by 
introducing potentially new pathways to the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons 
in a conventional conflict. The growing great power competition makes decision-
makers focus mostly on the potential military benefits that new technologies 
might provide. Yet, as discussed above, the introduction of such technologies 
also presents some real risks that could make nuclear conflict more likely. 
Those risks have not been fully understood and appreciated by decision-makers 
as well as their civilian and military advisors. One important step to maintain 
crisis stability among the three countries, therefore, would be to jointly raise 
awareness of such risks. Due to the level of technical complexity involved in 
these issues, the three countries should consider setting up joint expert working 
groups to examine each of the main areas where non-nuclear technologies 
could introduce new nuclear risks. These areas of non-nuclear technologies 
may include, but are not limited to, ambiguities stemming from conventional 
and dual-capable hypersonic missiles; risks of cyber interference with nuclear 
communication, command, and control systems; possible confusions caused by 
the entanglement of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons systems; and potential 
misuse of AI in strategic early warning and nuclear decision-making systems. 
Even unilateral risk reduction measures aimed at reflecting such considerations 
in each country’s military planning and defense procurement projects could be 
very helpful.
A trilateral discussion on the alert status and practices of their nuclear forces 
could also contribute to crisis stability. There appears interest in some quarters 
of the Chinese military to argue for China’s shift toward a launch-under-attack 
or launch-on-warning (LUA/LOW) posture – for further improving the credibility 
of China’s nuclear retaliatory capability.36 As China makes more efforts to build 
its own early warning system (with increasing Russian assistance), China’s 
traditional thinking on the pros and cons of adopting LUA/LOW posture may 
change. The United States and Russia have kept their strategic nuclear weapons 
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on operationally available status during peacetime for their own unique reasons, 
but they also have rich experiences of going through dangerous incidents with 
their early warning systems and important lessons for caution that they could 
share with Chinese military experts in a trilateral setting. At least, they could help 
introduce to China the necessity of enhancing effective crisis communication 
between nuclear rivals through measures such as setting up nuclear risk 
reduction centers.
3. CONCLUSION
China stands to benefit from participating in such exchanges, if it keeps an 
open mind to recognize the invaluable lessons it can obtain and if it avoids the 
others’ mistakes. It should have no fear to adopt near-term confidence-building 
measures and to start considering longer-term arms control options. No one can 
force China into unfair arms control deals. China’s ever advanced hard power 
and diplomatic skills should give itself strong confidence that it can negotiate 
good arms control agreements that can better protect its own security interests 
than in an alternative world of uncontrolled and unlimited military great power 
competition. Trilateral arms control with the United States and Russia is one 
option for China to think about its future cooperative security strategy. Nothing 
prevents China from simultaneously considering other forms of arms control 
cooperation such as participating in a P5 multilateral arms control process or 
entering bilateral talks with America. These options are not mutually exclusive. 
For China, what it needs now is to demonstrate the political will to start exploring 
all possible options, including trilateral ones. As China begins to “take center 
stage in the world,”37 it will be hard to imagine its top leader’s grand vision of 
“building a community with a shared future for mankind”38 can be achieved 
without engaging in cooperative arms control measures in the future. Early 
preparations for this future are in China’s interest.
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